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SURROGACY AND THE POLITICS OF 
COMMODIFICATION 
ELIZABETH S. SCOTT* 
 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, the Illinois legislature passed the Gestational Surrogacy Act, which 
provides that a child conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF) and born to a 
surrogate mother automatically becomes the legal child of the intended parents 
at birth if certain conditions are met. Under the Act, the woman who bears the 
child has no parental status.1 The bill generated modest media attention, but 
little controversy;2 it passed unanimously in both houses of the legislature and 
was signed into law by the governor.3 
This mundane story of the legislative process in action stands in sharp 
contrast to the political tale of surrogacy that unfolded in the 1980s and early 
1990s as the Baby M case4 left its mark on American law. It was through the 
lens of Baby M that this innovative use of reproductive technology was first 
scrutinized as an issue of social, political, and legal interest.5 Over the course of 
the litigation between the intended parents, William and Elizabeth Stern, and 
the surrogate mother, Mary Beth Whitehead, hostility toward commercial 
surrogacy6 arrangements hardened. Opponents of surrogacy—mostly feminists 
and religious groups—argued that the contracts were baby-selling arrangements 
that exploited poor women who either were coerced or did not understand the 
consequences of their decisions. Opponents argued that surrogacy degraded the 
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 1. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/1-75 (2006); see infra notes 90–96 and accompanying text. 
 2. See Judith Graham, State Sets Standards on Surrogacy Birth; Legislation Called Most Liberal in 
U.S., CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 2005, at C1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 5. See infra notes 22–30 and accompanying text for a description of the Baby M trial and appeal. 
 6. In this article “surrogacy” refers to commercial surrogacy, in which a woman is paid to carry 
and bear the product of her egg and donor sperm or an implanted, fertilized donor egg. Compare “gift 
surrogacy,” in which a woman agrees to carry and bear another’s child without payment. 
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female reproductive function and undermined the family. This framing of the 
transaction as illegitimate commodification was adopted by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Baby M and prevailed for several years thereafter, with far-
reaching effects on legal regulation. By the early 1990s, many states had enacted 
laws prohibiting or severely restricting surrogacy agreements.7 Some observers 
predicted the end of this particular use of reproductive technology.8 
But that did not happen. In fact, the politics and social meaning of surrogacy 
arrangements have slowly changed, and the alarm and hostility that surrounded 
this issue have diminished substantially. An alternative frame has emerged, in 
which altruistic surrogates (contractually bound and compensated nonetheless) 
provide the “gift of life” to deserving couples who otherwise would be unable to 
have children. News stories about surrogacy arrangements in the past decade 
have tended to be upbeat, human-interest tales describing warm relationships 
between surrogates and the couples for whom they bear children9—a far cry 
from the acrimonious battle between Ms. Whitehead and the Sterns over Baby 
M. 
The political and judicial response to surrogacy has also changed in recent 
years. In Illinois and other states, the contemporary legislative approach has 
been largely pragmatic, driven by a perception that parties will continue to 
enter these agreements and thus, that it is important to have procedures that 
establish parental status in intended parents.10 In the absence of statutory 
authority, several courts, including the California Supreme Court, have also 
enforced gestational-surrogacy contracts and have held that the intended 
parents can be named on the birth certificate.11 Although social conservatives 
 
 7. The New York statute passed in 1992 was reported to be the eighteenth statute prohibiting or 
severely restricting commercial surrogacy contracts. See George E. Curry, New York State May Bar 
Mothers for Hire, Surrogate Parenting for Pay at Issue, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1992, at 17; sources cited 
infra note 53. 
 8. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 9. See Gina Bellefante, Surrogate Mothers’ New Niche: Bearing Babies for Gay Couples, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 27, 2005, at A1 (profiling various surrogacy relationships between women and gay 
couples); Judy Keen, Surrogates Relish Unique Role; And Science Has a Place in the Family Too, USA 
TODAY, Jan. 23, 2007, at D1 (profiling the positive surrogacy relationship between a woman and a gay 
couple); Raina Kelley et al., The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2008, at 44 
(describing surrogacy as “[a]n act of love, but also a financial transaction, that brings people together”); 
Alex Kuczynski, Her Body, My Baby: My Adventures with a Surrogate Mom, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 
30, 2008, at 42 (describing the author’s experience as an intended parent); Monica Rogers, The Birth of 
a New Tradition; Showers for Surrogates, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 2005, at C1 (describing baby showers 
thrown for surrogate mothers); Brigid Schulte, Sharing the Gift of Life, WASH. POST, May 4, 2008, at 
C1 (profiling the positive relationship between a surrogate mother, surrogate daughter, and intended 
parents after fourteen years). Tina Fey and Amy Poehler recently starred in BABY MAMA (Universal 
Pictures 2008), a wacky comedy about a surrogacy arrangement gone awry that got mixed reviews but 
grossed approximately $70,000,000. See Baby Mama, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/ 
movies/?id=babymama.htm (last visited May 19, 2009). 
 10. See, e.g., infra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
 11. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (enforcing contract over gestational mother’s 
objection); Doe v. Roe, 717 A.2d 706 (Conn. 1998) (holding that trial court had jurisdiction to approve 
surrogacy agreement); In re Roberto D.B., 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007) (reversing lower court’s refusal to 
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continue to speak out against surrogacy in the political arena,12 most 
contemporary groups interested in this issue advocate in favor of laws enforcing 
the arrangements.13 
This account raises a number of puzzling questions. How did it happen that 
surrogacy was framed as baby selling during the Baby M litigation? And why 
did the case generate such powerful emotional, ideological, and political 
responses that, institutionalized through legislation, continue to define the law 
in many states? Just as important—why did the politics and social meaning of 
surrogacy change, such that a more sanguine view of the practice seems to have 
emerged in recent years? Why did interest groups, particularly feminists, that 
played such a key role in advocating restrictive laws after Baby M, mobilize 
during the litigation and then over time seemingly lose interest in this issue? 
This article explores the history of surrogacy over the past twenty years in an 
effort to shed some light on these questions. 
A roadmap of the essay may be helpful. Section II offers a historical account 
of the legal and social issues surrounding surrogacy over the past twenty years. 
These issues present the puzzle that the rest of the article seeks to resolve. 
Section III examines how surrogacy was framed as commodification in the Baby 
M context. Although opponents of surrogacy had legitimate concerns about 
unfamiliar uses of reproductive technology, the political and legal responses to 
this case were to a considerable extent a combination of moral panic and 
interest-group politics. The vivid drama of Baby M came to symbolize the 
pernicious threat that commercialization of reproductive technology posed to 
conventional understandings of the family and of motherhood. Opinion leaders, 
primarily religious groups and feminists, reinforced the moral panic and formed 
an unlikely but effective coalition that persisted for several years. Of particular 
interest is the role of feminists in the political arena and why they ultimately 
unified in a stance favoring legal prohibition of surrogacy that was in tension 
with other feminist views about reproductive agency. In section IV, I seek to 
explain how and why the social and political meanings of surrogacy have 
changed over the past decade. Several factors have been important: The moral 
panic has dissipated, as many of the predicted harms have not been realized. 
Further, advances in IVF have expanded the use of gestational surrogacy, 
which, because the surrogate is not genetically related to the baby, was less 
 
remove the surrogate mother’s name from a birth certificate when both the surrogate mother and the 
genetic intended parent desired that the surrogate’s name be removed); Culliton v. Beth Israel 
Deaconess Med. Cntr., 756 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass. 2001) (hospital ordered to place gestational intended 
parents’ names on birth certificate); A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000) (allowing 
birth certificate naming intended, genetic parents to issue after a waiting period, but refusing to enforce 
a pre-birth contract terminating the surrogate mother’s parental rights); J.F. v D.B., 879 N.E.2d 749 
(Ohio 2007) (holding gestational-surrogacy contract was not against public policy and should be 
enforced); J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (Utah 2002) (Utah statute prohibiting recording of genetic 
parents’ names on birth certificate held unconstitutional as an undue burden on the fundamental right 
to procreate). 
 12. See, e.g., infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., infra notes 94–101 and accompanying text. 
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readily framed as commodification and thus was more palatable than traditional 
surrogacy.14 Finally, the interest-group dynamic has changed: women’s groups 
have withdrawn their engagement with the issue, perhaps because their 
arguments against surrogacy were increasingly adopted by anti-abortion 
advocates. These conditions have contributed to a political climate in which 
lawmakers have adopted a pragmatic approach, authorizing surrogacy 
arrangements while seeking to minimize potential tangible harms. In a liberal 
society, this stance seems like the correct governmental response to a social 
practice that some continue to view with concern but about which no consensus 
exists. 
II 
THE FRAMING AND REFRAMING OF SURROGACY: A BRIEF HISTORY 
A. Baby M: Surrogacy as Commodification 
Political philosophers offer two objections to the commodification of certain 
transactions. The first focuses on coercion; exchanges that are driven by severe 
inequality, ignorance, or dire economic necessity are problematic.15 The second 
objection focuses on corruption and holds that the market has a degrading 
effect on certain goods and practices.16 As the Baby M case unfolded, both 
objections were aimed at surrogacy, effectively framing the transactions as illicit 
commodification. Opponents claimed that surrogacy unfairly exploited poor 
women who unwillingly entered contracts that they would come to regret.17 
Critics also claimed that surrogacy degraded children and women by treating 
children as commodities to be exchanged for profit and women’s bodies as 
childbearing factories; the arrangements also degraded the mother–child 
relationship by paying women not to bond with their children.18 
Surrogacy arrangements were not completely unfamiliar to lawmakers or to 
the public in 1986, when the Baby M story first attracted media attention. In the 
early 1980s, a few courts had addressed whether surrogacy contracts were 
 
 14. “Gestational surrogacy” refers to conception via IVF, where the surrogate is unrelated 
genetically to the child and “traditional surrogacy” refers to conception via artificial insemination, as in 
Baby M. The surrogate is the biological mother of the child in traditional surrogacy and (usually) the 
intended father is the sperm donor. 
 15. Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, Address at 
Brasenose College, Oxford (May 11–12, 1998), in 21 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 
94 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2000), available at http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/sande 
100.pdf (explaining how socioeconomic inequality might lead to coercion as on objection to surrogacy).  
 16. Id.; see also Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity? 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 
74 (1990) (arguing that when women’s capacity to carry children “is treated as a commodity, the women 
who perform it are degraded”); Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 
1928–36 (1987) (analyzing surrogacy as the commodification of women’s reproductive services and of 
children). 
 17. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 16, at 1930. 
 18. See, e.g., id. at 1932–34. 
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enforceable,19 and in 1986 a bill regulating (but allowing) the enforcement of 
these novel arrangements was under consideration in the New York 
legislature.20 Surrogacy had also received some media and academic attention.21 
But the Baby M case—a dramatic and emotional legal battle between a 
housewife who had dropped out of high school and a couple with graduate 
degrees and professional careers who sought to have a child with her 
assistance—focused national attention on the issue and framed the practice as 
commodification. 
The outlines of the Baby M story are familiar. In February 1985, Mary Beth 
Whitehead and Bill Stern executed the surrogacy contract, brokered by the 
Infertility Center of New York and its director Noel Keane.22 Days after Ms. 
Whitehead gave birth, she delivered the baby to the Sterns (who named her 
Melissa), but she returned the next day and told them that she “could not live 
without [the] baby.”23 Shortly thereafter, Ms. Whitehead and her husband took 
the baby to Florida to hide out with relatives.24 After Ms. Whitehead was 
apprehended and the baby returned to the Sterns, Ms. Whitehead fought Mr. 
Stern’s effort to enforce the contract in a highly publicized and messy trial that 
stretched over two months.25 At its end, Judge Harold Sorkow held the 
surrogacy contract valid, ordering that Ms. Whitehead’s parental rights be 
terminated and that Mr. Stern receive sole custody; shortly thereafter, the judge 
entered an order allowing Ms. Stern’s adoption of Melissa.26 
 
 19. See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986) (holding that a 
Kentucky statute prohibiting the sale of a child “for the purpose of adoption” does not apply to a 
surrogacy contract entered into prior to conception); Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 362 N.W.2d 211 (Mich. 
1985) (holding the Michigan Paternity Act, allowing the putative father of a child born out of wedlock 
to seek a determination of paternity, applies when a surrogate mother is married and the biological and 
intended father is married to a different woman). 
 20. See James Feron, Testimony Given on Surrogates’ Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1987, at A39 
(describing testimony by infertile parents and surrogates favoring the bill). 
 21. See GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM 
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 272–324 (1985) (offering a feminist critique of 
surrogacy); Patricia A. Avery, Surrogate Mothers: Center of a New Storm, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
June 6, 1983, at 76. 
 22. Under the contract, Mr. Stern agreed to pay Ms. Whitehead $10,000 in exchange for her 
agreement to be inseminated, carry any resulting pregnancy to term, deliver the baby, and relinquish it 
to the Sterns, giving up her parental rights. Stern also agreed to pay $7500 to the Infertility Center of 
New York. Ms. Whitehead was artificially inseminated with Mr. Stern’s sperm and delivered a baby 
girl. The original birth certificate listed Ms. Whitehead and her husband as the parents of the baby. In 
the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236 (N.J. 1988). 
 23. Id at 1236–37. The Sterns reported that they believed Ms. Whitehead to be so distraught as to 
be suicidal, and so allowed her to keep the baby for a week. When it became apparent that Ms. 
Whitehead would not relinquish the baby, Mr. Stern sought to enforce the contract. Id. at 1237. 
 24. Id. Ms. Whitehead fled when a New Jersey process server attempted to deliver an order to 
relinquish custody. Id. 
 25. Margot Hornblower, Surrogate Mother Breaks Pact, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1986, at A3; 
Elizabeth Kolbert, Surrogate Mother Seeks Baby, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1986, at B2. 
 26. In the Matter of Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1175–76 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987), rev’d in part, 537 A.2d 
1227 (N.J. 1988). 
06_SCOTT_BOOK PROOF.DOC 11/9/2009  1:22:51 PM 
114 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:109 
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower court, 
holding that the contract was unenforceable under New Jersey statutory law 
and that it violated public policy.27 The court found that the contract offended 
public policy because it was effectively “the sale of a child,” prohibited in this 
context for the same reason that it was banned under state adoption law: 
because women needing money might be coerced into giving up their children.28 
Moreover, the pre-birth agreement by the mother to relinquish parental rights 
was explicitly prohibited under the adoption statute.29 The Court concluded that 
a surrogacy contract could never be voluntary or informed, because a woman 
could not know what it would mean to give up her baby.30  
*** 
Media coverage of the Baby M case was intense from the time the 
Whiteheads fled with Melissa to Florida, and it persisted through the New 
Jersey Supreme Court decision. This is not surprising. The case raised 
compelling questions about the uncertain impact of a novel use of reproductive 
technology on family structure, the nature of motherhood, the welfare of 
children, and the role of law in this unfamiliar terrain. The story also had 
powerful elements of human drama. 
Over the course of the trial, reporters observed a shift in public attitudes.31 
At the outset, the Sterns were viewed sympathetically as an infertile couple 
eager to have a child, while Ms. Whitehead was seen as an erratic woman who 
had reneged on her agreement.32 But as the trial progressed, Ms. Whitehead 
increasingly was portrayed as a victim, a working-class mother who was 
exploited and unfairly attacked by powerful adversaries.33 Trial narratives, 
repeated in the media, may have contributed to these shifts in attitude. Some 
observers were offended by the depiction of Whitehead as a bad mother by 
Stern’s experts, who questioned her parenting abilities on the basis of her 
 
 27. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240. 
 28. Id. at 1241 (“Our law prohibits paying or accepting money in connection with any placement of 
a child for adoption.”) (citing N.J. STAT ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1984) (repealed 1994)). The court 
noted that the policy underlying this law was, in part, concern that the possibility of money for children 
would make the decision “less voluntary.” Id. at 1241. 
 29. N.J. STAT ANN. § 9:3-41 (West 2009). 
 30. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1248 (opining that any decision “prior to the baby’s birth is, in the most 
important sense, uninformed”). 
 31. Iver Peterson, Fitness Test for Baby M’s Mother Unfair, Feminists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
1987, at B1 (noting a “shift in public attitude” from “an initial negative perception of Ms. Whitehead as 
a woman who had entered into a contract to have a baby for money and then reneged” to “a victim, 
exploited by people better off than she and subjected to unfair scrutiny of her family life and 
personality”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.; see also James Barron, Views on Surrogacy Harden After Baby M Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
2, 1987, at A1 (examining objections to commodified surrogacy); Michael Kinsley, Baby M and the 
Moral Logic of Capitalism, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1987, at 31 (noting that the Sterns’ “litigation 
steamroller” and status as “upper-middle-class professionals . . . created a backlash of sympathy for the 
underdog [Ms. Whitehead]”). 
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lifestyle, shaky finances, and failure to provide intellectual stimulation to the 
child.34 At the same time, Ms. Stern’s claim that she feared the impact of 
pregnancy on her health was challenged, perhaps effectively. Harold Cassidy, 
Ms. Whitehead’s attorney, described Ms. Stern to the jury as a woman who 
“thought her career . . . too important to bear her own children.”35 
Opposition to surrogacy arrangements and sympathy for Ms. Whitehead 
were generated by a disparate group of outspoken advocates and opinion 
leaders. Politicians denounced the practice; New Jersey Governor Thomas 
Kean appointed a task force to study surrogacy.36 Religious leaders played an 
important role, most prominently the Conference of Bishops of the Catholic 
Church. This group amplified a 1987 Papal statement on reproductive 
technologies arguing that surrogacy contracts were baby-selling arrangements 
that undermined the family, degraded women, and harmed children.37 Child-
welfare groups focused on the threat of harm to children if babies could be 
exchanged for cash, and adoption advocates argued that allowing surrogacy 
would erode the prohibition against purchasing babies for adoption.38 
Feminists and liberals were among the most active advocates, unifying 
against surrogacy as the Baby M litigation played out. Early in the trial, 
feminists acknowledged that surrogacy was a hard issue; news reports described 
them as “torn between support [of] a women’s right to use her body as she 
chooses” and concerns about the exploitation of women.39 But feminist 
columnists advocated vehemently in support of Whitehead and against 
 
 34. Peterson, supra note 31 (noting feminist objections to expert testimony questioning Ms. 
Whitehead’s parenting abilities on the basis of games she played with the child, such as “patty cake”); 
see also Katha Pollitt, The Strange Case of Baby M, THE NATION, May 23, 1987, at 682; infra notes 39–
42 and accompanying text. 
 35. Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, in CONTRACT 
STORIES 127 n.118 (2007); see also Pollitt, supra note 34, at 683. 
 36. See Kean Tells Legislators to Look at Surrogacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1987, at B2. Governor 
Kean seemed conflicted on the issue of surrogacy; he found surrogacy arrangements “deeply, deeply 
disturbing” and did not “like the idea of renting a womb,” but “to say it should be banned also goes 
against my grain.” Id. 
 37. JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN 
AND THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION: REPLIES TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF THE DAY (1987), http:// 
www.usccb.org/prolife/tdocs/donumvitae.shtml; see Church Hits Surrogacy, WASH. POST, July 16, 1987, 
at A9 (reporting on objections to surrogacy contracts in an amicus curiae brief filed by Roman Catholic 
bishops in the Baby M appeal); Craig R. McCoy, N.J. Bishops Decry Surrogate Parenting as 
Prostitution, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 16, 1987, at B1; Roberto Suro, Vatican’s Moral Mission, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1987, at A1. 
 38. Child Welfare Unit Plans to Urge a Ban on Surrogacy Pacts, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1987, at A1. 
 39. Iver Peterson, Baby M Trial Splits Ranks of Feminists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1987, at B1 
(reporting that the membership of the New Jersey National Organization for Women split on 
surrogacy); see also PHYLLIS CHESLER, SACRED BOND: THE LEGACY OF BABY M (1988) (describing 
the reluctance of feminists to rally around Whitehead early in the trial); Debbie Ratterman, The Attack 
on Motherhood, OFF OUR BACKS: A WOMEN’S NEWSJOURNAL, Dec. 31, 1988, at 41 (reviewing 
SACRED BOND, which describes the split among feminists in their support of Whitehead). 
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surrogacy, criticizing the Sterns, Judge Sorkow, and Noel Keane, the broker.40 
Moreover, women’s advocates became increasingly angry at the attacks on Ms. 
Whitehead by the Sterns’ lawyers and mental-health experts, believing that the 
emphasis on her lifestyle and financial problems was infused with class bias and 
the gender discrimination typical of child-custody disputes.41 Ms. Whitehead 
was, in their view, “being held to an unfair standard of motherhood.”42 
Feminists also targeted intermediaries such as Noel Keane, who charged high 
fees for arranging the contracts.43 As one feminist put it, these brokers, who 
exploited poor women with few options, were “the pimps of the surrogacy 
movement.”44 By the time the trial concluded with a judgment upholding the 
contract, feminists and women’s groups presented a united front in opposition 
to surrogacy; few defended the judge’s decision. On the last day of trial 
testimony, 124 prominent women released a statement supporting Ms. 
Whitehead’s right to keep the child and denouncing surrogacy.45 Prominent 
feminists also submitted an amicus brief to the New Jersey Supreme Court 
arguing for reversal of the trial-court decision, as did the New Jersey Catholic 
Congress, the Family Research Council, and the National Committee for 
Adoption.46 Amicus briefs arguing for reversal of the trial-court decision greatly 
outnumbered those that favored upholding the decision.47 
Over the course of the Baby M litigation, advocates in the political arena 
effectively framed surrogacy as illegitimate commodification. First, the 
characterization of the surrogacy transaction as baby selling was invoked 
repeatedly by opponents; ultimately it was adopted by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court and by lawmakers in other states.48 Surrogacy, it was argued, threatened 
not only the specific children who were produced through these arrangements, 
 
 40. Ellen Goodman, Surrogates Could Make Pregnancy an Industry, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1986, at 
B5 (“I do not believe that anyone should be able to sign away parental rights before she has even borne 
the child. A baby is not a piece of goods, and human emotions do not make for neat contracts.”); 
Pollitt, supra note 34, at 681. 
 41. Pollitt, supra note 34, at 682. 
 42. Peterson, supra note 31. One expert diagnosed Ms. Whitehead as having a narcissistic 
personality disorder because she dyed her hair and criticized her for offering Melissa a stuffed panda 
rather than pots and pans. Id. Phyllis Chesler, a key supporter of Ms. Whitehead, made the link to the 
broader issue of discrimination in child-custody disputes. See CHESLER, supra note 39, at 11, 16, 97. 
 43. Keane received $7500 for the Infertility Center’s services in brokering the contract. In the 
Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236 (N.J. 1988); see supra note 22. 
 44. See Peterson, supra note 31. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Joseph S. Sullivan, Brief by Feminists Opposes Surrogate Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 
1987, at B3. 
 47. See the list of amicus curiae briefs in In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 48. In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1249–50 (“[T]he essential evil is the same [as in the sale of 
a child for adoption], taking advantage of a woman’s circumstances (the unwanted pregnancy or the 
need for money) in order to take away her child . . . . There are, in civilized society, some things that 
money can’t buy[;] . . . the surrogate mother’s agreement to sell her child is void.”); see also infra notes 
51–54 and accompanying text (describing the use of commodification rhetoric in New York). 
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but the social value of children generally.49 Second, opponents also argued that 
these arrangements exploited poor women who did not understand the serious 
consequences of their decisions to bear children for the benefit of wealthier, 
more-powerful men.50 The intense focus on surrogacy over the course of the 
trial and appeal profoundly influenced public and political opinion about these 
arrangements. At the outset surrogacy contracts were unfamiliar, but were 
likely viewed by most people with curiosity rather than alarm. Over time, 
opposition to surrogacy grew in the political arena; the New Jersey Supreme 
Court decision simply reinforced and solidified the emerging social meaning of 
surrogacy as an undesirable commercial arrangement that involved the selling 
of children and exploitation of women. 
B. The Aftermath of Baby M 
It would be hard to exaggerate the impact of Baby M on the legislative 
regulation of surrogacy arrangements in the late 1980s and early 1990s. When 
the case broke in 1987, no state had enacted a statute regulating surrogacy 
arrangements; those that began to consider the issue in the mid-1980s were 
inclined to regulate rather than to prohibit the contracts.51 But by December of 
1987, even before the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Baby M, seventy bills 
concerning surrogacy had been introduced in twenty-seven legislatures, and by 
late 1988, six states had passed laws banning the agreements or declaring them 
void—often with little opposition.52 As Baby M played out, surrogacy opponents 
framed the transactions as baby-selling and exploitation of women, and 
legislatures responded to advocates’ calls for restriction of the practice. Almost 
all the laws passed during the post–Baby M period either prohibited the 
agreements or discouraged them by disallowing payment to the surrogate or to 
intermediaries or by giving surrogates the right to rescind after the birth of the 
baby.53 In some states, lawmakers initiated the legislation, often with little 
 
 49. Anderson, supra note 16, at 78. 
 50. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. 
 51. See N.Y. ST. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., SURROGATE PARENTING IN NEW YORK: A 
PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM, at 40 (1987) [hereinafter SURROGATE PARENTING IN N.Y.] 
(proposing regulation of contractual surrogacy in New York and discussing the law in other states). 
 52. Sam O. Okpaku, The Aftereffects of the Baby M Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1988, § 12, at 26. 
The Nebraska legislature voted 41–1 in favor of a bill prohibiting commercial surrogacy arrangements. 
Anti-Surrogacy Bill Passes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1988, § 1, at 28; see also ‘Baby M’ Bill Passes in 
Michigan, WASH. POST, June 10, 1988, at A4 (describing Michigan bill banning commercial surrogacy); 
Phillip J. Hilts, N.Y. Ban Urged on Surrogate-Mother Deals, WASH. POST, May 30, 1988, at A4 
(reporting that twenty states were considering banning commercial surrogacy). 
 53. Hilts, supra note 52. Post-Baby M statutes included: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) 
(1989) (prohibiting commercial surrogacy contracts and granting the surrogate status as the legal 
mother), invalidated by Soos v. Superior Ct. (Maricopa County), 897 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Ariz. App. 1994) 
(holding that the statute violates equal protection, for “a man [can] rebut the presumption of legal 
paternity by proving ‘fatherhood’ but [the statute] does not provide the same opportunity for a 
woman”); IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1 (1988) (declaring surrogacy contracts unenforceable as against public 
policy); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (1987) (declaring surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable as 
against public policy); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 722.851–.863 (1988) (declaring surrogacy contracts void 
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apparent involvement by lobbying groups.54 In other states, such as New York, a 
coalition of religious groups, adoption and child-welfare advocates, and 
women’s groups actively lobbied for laws that prohibited or discouraged the 
practice.55 
In New York, where Noel Keane’s agency had brokered the Whitehead–
Stern contract, the legislature changed course mid-stream in response to the 
Baby M decision. In early 1987, a bill that had been aimed at protecting women 
and children against exploitation while ensuring judicial enforcement of 
surrogacy contracts that met statutory requirements was making its way quietly 
through the legislature. By June, this bill was withdrawn in the face of intense 
opposition from a coalition of religious organizations and women’s groups.56 A 
task force created by Governor Mario Cuomo, an opponent of surrogacy,57 held 
hearings dominated by surrogacy opponents. The task force issued a report that 
referred frequently to Baby M and emphasized the threat posed by contracts 
commodifying children and exploiting poor women.58 The report proposed 
statutory reform banning surrogacy and subjecting brokers to criminal 
penalties.59 
Beginning in 1989, Governor Cuomo introduced legislation based on the 
task-force recommendations. The legislature did not act until 1992, however, 
when the New York State Department of Health published a report describing 
the flourishing surrogacy market in New York.60 The report focused particularly 
 
and unenforceable as against public policy; declaring payment for surrogacy a misdemeanor); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (1988) (declaring surrogacy contracts void); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to -
07 (1989) (declaring surrogacy contracts void and that surrogate is the legal mother of the resulting 
child); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1989) (granting surrogate status as the legal mother), invalidated 
by J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1272 (D. Utah 2003) (a statute presuming a gestational surrogate 
is the mother is unconstitutional as a burden on the fundamental right to privacy and procreation). 
 54. For example, the Nebraska statute passed in early 1988 on a forty-one to one vote of the 
legislature, with what appears to be minimal consideration by the legislature. Anti-Surrogacy Bill 
Passes, supra note 52. 
 55. See infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text. 
 56. See SURROGATE PARENTING IN N.Y., supra note 51, at 51–56 (recommending legislation 
requiring judicial approval of a surrogacy contract prior to artificial insemination, suggesting means to 
ensure informed consent, and setting forth a specific-performance remedy for breach); Jeffrey Schmalz, 
Albany Surrogacy Bill is Withdrawn, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1987, at B2. 
 57. See Hilts, supra note 52. 
 58. In the task force hearings held in May 1987, the New York State Coalition on Women’s 
Legislative Issues urged that “surrogacy contracts dehumanized women and commercialized 
reproduction.” The group also argued that women could not waive their parental rights before birth 
when they could not calculate the enormous physical and emotional effects of pregnancy. N.Y. STATE 
TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, SURROGATE PARENTING: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR PUBLIC POLICY 104–05 (1988) [hereinafter SURROGATE PARENTING: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY]. 
 59. Id. at A2. 
 60. NEW YORK ST. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, THE BUSINESS OF SURROGATE PARENTING 1 (1992) 
[hereinafter THE BUSINESS OF SURROGATE PARENTING]; see Curry, supra note 7 (describing the 
importance of the Health Department report as an impetus for legislation after several unsuccessful 
efforts by Governor Cuomo, beginning in 1989). 
06_SCOTT_BOOK PROOF.DOC 11/9/2009  1:22:51 PM 
Summer 2009] SURROGACY AND THE POLITICS OF COMMODIFICATION 119 
on Noel Keane’s business and strongly advocated the passage of Cuomo’s bill.61 
The legislature responded quickly, passing the law by a sizable majority in the 
Assembly and near unanimity in the Senate.62 
The legislative vote mirrored strong and diverse support for the bill and 
widespread hostility toward surrogacy. Newspaper editorials around the state 
overwhelmingly supported the legislation. (The Daily News editorial, with 
characteristic hyperbole, carried the headline, “Wanna Buy a Baby?”)63 Several 
state agencies endorsed the bill, including the Council on Children and Families 
and the Division for Women, which argued that surrogacy “reinforces the 
notion that women and children are chattels.”64 Also supporting the legislative 
ban were the New York State Catholic Conference, the New York Civil 
Liberties Union, and the National Council for Adoption, which described Noel 
Keane’s agency as a “seedy business.”65 Finally, feminists and women’s groups 
were united in support of the legislation. The New York Women’s Bar 
Association and the New York chapter of NOW (the National Organization for 
Women) lobbied actively for passage of the law.66 The bill was sponsored in the 
Assembly by Helene Weinstein, a pro-choice Brooklyn Democrat.67 
 
 61. See THE BUSINESS OF SURROGATE PARENTING, supra note 60, at 1; see also David Bauder, 
Proposal Targets Surrogate Parenting, THE TIMES UNION (Albany), May 13, 1992, at B10. 
 62. N.Y. Counsel to the Governor, 12590 Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, ch. 308, at 2 (1992) 
[hereinafter Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket] (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems) (reporting 
the results of the Senate vote on the bill, 59–0, and the General Assembly vote, 104–39). 
 63. Editorial, Ban Commercial Surrogacy, BUFF. NEWS, June 11, 1989; Editorial, It’s Baby-Selling 
and It’s Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1988, at A26; Editorial, Wanna Buy a Baby?, DAILY NEWS, May 
19, 1992; Editorial, Womb to Rent, NEWSDAY, June 8, 1992, at 32. 
 64. Memorandum from Paulette Taylor, General Counsel, State of New York Division for 
Women, to Elizabeth Moore, Counsel to the Governor (July 9, 1992), Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, 
supra note 62, at 25; Memorandum from Frederick B. Meservy, Acting Executive Director, State of 
New York Council on Children and Families to Elizabeth Moore, Counsel to the Governor (July 8, 
1992), Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 24. 
 65. Memorandum from New York Civil Liberties Union to Elizabeth Moore, Counsel to the 
Governor (1992), Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62 at 28–29; Letter from William Pierce, 
President, National Council for Adoption, to Christopher J. Mega, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee 
(May 22, 1992), Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 41. John M. Kerry of the Catholic 
Conference suggested that a child born of a surrogacy arrangement would “grow up with the horrifying 
realization that his real mother conceived him in order to sell him.” Letter from John M. Kerry, 
Executive Director of the New York State Catholic Conference, to Elizabeth Moore, Counsel to the 
Governor (June 30, 1992), Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 94–95. 
 66. Letter & Memorandum from Joan Leary Matthews, Co-Chair, Women’s Bar Association of 
the State of New York, to Mario M. Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York (July 9, 1992), 
Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 32–36; Memorandum from Marilyn Pitterman, 
President; Lois Shapiro-Canter, Lobbyist; and Simone Charlton, Legislative Vice President, New York 
State National Organization for Women, to Elizabeth Moore, Counsel to the Governor (May 26, 1992), 
Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 62. The NOW memorandum described surrogacy as 
threatening the “potential erosion of parental, reproductive, and privacy rights of women.” 
 67. Letter from G. Oliver Koppell, Member of Assembly, to Mario M. Cuomo, Governor of the 
State of New York (July 2, 1992), Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 15 (noting 
Weinstein’s sponsorship of the bill). 
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Opposition was muted. A few legislators argued that the bill was far too 
restrictive and that reasonable regulation could diminish the relatively modest 
risks posed by surrogacy arrangements.68 Beyond this, opposition to the 
proposed law was not organized, coming from a few surrogate mothers and 
from infertile couples, some of whom had acquired children through 
surrogacy.69 Interestingly, brokers seem to have participated little in the 
legislative process, including Noel Keane, whose business was the target of 
much criticism.70 
The 1992 passage of the New York statute represents the political high-
water mark of the antisurrogacy movement. Enthusiastic supporters of the bill 
hoped that surrogacy would soon die out as other states followed New York’s 
lead in prohibiting the agreements.71 But this did not happen. Political and 
media interest in surrogacy dwindled, and by the mid-1990s, little legislative 
activity focused on this issue. In some states, bills prohibiting surrogacy died 
without action. For example, in 1993, legislative sponsors in New Jersey 
proposed a bill similar to the New York statute, based on the recommendations 
of the task force appointed by Governor Thomas Kean, which had studied 
surrogacy exhaustively for four years.72 The bill generated little interest or 
support and it was withdrawn in 1994, never to be reintroduced.73 
C. Toward a New Model of Surrogacy Regulation 
Contrary to predictions, surrogacy has flourished over the past decade and 
attitudes toward these arrangements have mellowed considerably in the 
political arena, despite restrictive laws in such key states as New York. 
Legislatures in several states have established procedures and requirements for 
 
 68. Id. (letter opposing bill). Koppell pointed out that the Health Department report, THE 
BUSINESS OF SURROGATE PARENTING, supra note 60, found only three cases involving serious 
problems. Id. 
 69. Parent’s letters described their joy in their children and warm relationships with surrogates. See 
letters collected in Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62; see also Curry, supra note 7 
(describing “no organized opposition”). 
 70. In an interview, Noel Keane even appeared to endorse allowing courts to decide custody if the 
surrogate backs out. Catherine Clabby, Surrogate Moms on the Way Out? New Law Prohibits 
Pregnancy Profits, THE TIMES UNION (Albany), July 26, 1992, at 1 (quoting Keane regarding waiting 
periods: “If [a surrogate] changes her mind in a 20- to 30-day period, you could award custody by the 
courts based on the best interests of the child.”). Only Betsy Aigen, owner of a small surrogacy agency, 
opposed the bill. Letter from Dr. Betsy Aigen to Elizabeth Moore, Counsel to the Governor, 
Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 53–61. 
 71. See, e.g., Antisurrogacy Laws Gain Ground on “Baby Sellers,” Challengers Say Last Hopes Are 
Worth a Fight, BALTIMORE SUN, July 28, 1992, at 4A (expressing hope that the law would eliminate the 
practice). This hope may have seemed quite realistic in that forty percent of the surrogacy 
arrangements in the country were brokered in New York. See Clabby, supra note 70. 
 72. See N.J. COMM. ON LEGAL & ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE, 
AFTER BABY M: THE LEGAL, ETHICAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF SURROGACY (1992) 
[hereinafter AFTER BABY M] (findings of the New Jersey Task Force regarding surrogacy and 
proposed reform). 
 73. Randy Diamond, Assembly Baby Broker Bill Goes Nowhere, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Mar. 
16, 1994, at A5. 
06_SCOTT_BOOK PROOF.DOC 11/9/2009  1:22:51 PM 
Summer 2009] SURROGACY AND THE POLITICS OF COMMODIFICATION 121 
enforcing surrogacy contracts, while in other states, courts have upheld the 
agreements.74 A survey of these lawmaking activities and of recent media 
coverage suggests that surrogacy has assumed a new social meaning. Today the 
issue is seldom framed as baby selling and exploitation; instead, the discourse 
emphasizes the service provided by surrogates to couples who otherwise could 
not have genetically related children.75 Moreover, the legislative goal of 
discouraging and punishing a pernicious practice largely has been replaced by 
the pragmatic objective of providing certainty about parental status and 
protecting all participants, especially children.76 
Two factors stand out in the account of these legal developments. First, with 
improvements in IVF, gestational surrogacy, in which a pre-embryo is 
implanted in the surrogate, has largely replaced traditional surrogacy, in which 
the pregnancy results from artificial insemination of the surrogate’s own egg. 
Gestational surrogacy has proven to be more attractive to the parties and more 
palatable to lawmakers and the public.77 Second, the constellation of interest 
groups lobbying to shape legislation in recent years has changed dramatically. 
Attorneys, brokers, and parents’ groups have become active advocates for 
supportive laws, while women’s groups and civil-liberties organizations have 
withdrawn from the political arena. Today only religious groups and social 
conservatives lobby actively against facilitative regulation.78 
1.  The Rise of Gestational Surrogacy: Calvert v. Johnson 
In the wave of legislation that followed Baby M, little attention was directed 
toward the distinction between traditional and gestational surrogacy. This may 
not be surprising, in that Baby M herself was the product of traditional 
surrogacy, and gestational surrogacy was not common in the 1980s.79 Most 
statutes enacted in the late 1980s and early 1990s applied generically to all 
surrogacy contracts, as did the ABA Model Act and the Uniform Act.80 
This generic response began to change with Calvert v. Johnson, a 1993 
California Supreme Court decision involving a baby who was the genetic child 
 
 74. See, e.g., the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/1-75 (2006); see also 
cases cited supra note 11. 
 75. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9. 
 76. This response is evident in statements by legislators in Illinois and other states, see infra note 
88, and by courts, authorizing intended parents to be named on the birth certificate, even without 
statutory authorization, see cases cited supra note 11. 
 77. See infra notes 81–87 and accompanying text. 
 78. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 79. Louise Brown was the first child born by IVF in 1978. Thus, gestational surrogacy was 
relatively new in the 1980s. The use of IVF increased dramatically from the mid-1980s through 2002. 
DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE AND POLITICS DRIVE THE 
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 24, 32 (2006). 
 80. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988); A.B.A’s 2 Models for 
‘Baby M’ Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1989, at C13 (noting that the 1989 ABA Model Surrogacy Act 
offered two alternatives—a ban on enforcement of contracts providing financial compensation to a 
surrogate, and a statute authorizing but regulating surrogacy). 
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of both intended parents.81 The court rejected the parental claim of the 
gestational surrogate (Johnson), holding that the intended mother (Calvert) 
was the child’s legal mother. The court found that Johnson and Calvert had 
both produced “acceptable proof of maternity” under California’s parentage 
statute—Johnson on the basis of pregnancy and birth, and Calvert on the basis 
of genetics—distinguishing the case from the traditional arrangement in which 
the surrogate was both the genetic and the gestational parent. The court held 
that, in this situation, parental status should be determined on the basis of the 
parties’ intentions as expressed in the surrogacy contract. Rejecting Johnson’s 
argument that the surrogate had a “constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
the companionship of the child, based on her status as the ‘birth mother,’” the 
court concluded that, as a surrogate, Johnson was not exercising procreative 
choice, but was providing a service.82 
Calvert generated surprisingly little controversy,83 but the case had a 
profound impact on surrogacy practice. Gestational surrogacy quickly became 
the preferred arrangement.84 Within a relatively brief period, many states went 
beyond Calvert, recognizing the parental status of intended mothers when a 
donated egg was used and neither the surrogate nor the intended mother was 
the child’s genetic mother.85 Gestational surrogacy arrangements became 
standard, in part because they offered legal certainty about the parental status 
of all parties to the surrogacy contract, and also because improvements in 
reproductive technology made pregnancy outcomes in IVF more predictable 
and thus less costly than in its early years.86 
The difference between gestational- and traditional-surrogacy contracts has 
become an important legal distinction. In the absence of statutory authority, 
numerous courts have directed that intended parents, and not the surrogate, be 
named on the birth certificate in gestational arrangements.87 Moreover, the new 
Uniform Parentage Act and most of the surrogacy statutes enacted since 2000 
 
 81. 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993). Ms. Calvert, the intended mother, could not become pregnant 
because of a hysterectomy. 
 82. Id. at 787. The court distinguished between the constitutional protections granted to a woman 
who chooses to bear her own child and a woman who enters a contractual surrogacy agreement. Id. 
 83. Katha Pollitt was unusual in her scathing denunciation of the Calvert decision. Katha Pollitt, 
When is a Mother Not a Mother?, THE NATION, Dec. 31, 1990, at 839, 842 (“[The decision] defines, or 
redefines, maternity in a way that is thoroughly degrading to women.”). 
 84. See Sanger, supra note 35, at 140. 
 85. See cases cited supra note 11. 
 86. SPAR, supra note 79, at 28–30. In 1985, IVF produced a child about 10–15% of the time; by 
2002, the odds had risen to 30–35% for women under age 35. Id. at 28, 55. 
 87. See cases cited supra note 11. When all parties are in agreement, courts have struck down state 
statutes prohibiting such agreements. For example, one appellate court held a statute making the 
surrogate the child’s legal mother to be unconstitutional when applied to disputes between the intended 
parents when the intended mother was also the biological parent. Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356, 
1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (striking down statute on equal-protection grounds for treating genetic 
mother and father differently); see also J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2003) (holding Utah 
statute unconstitutional that prohibited putting the genetic parent’s names on the birth certificate and 
that automatically granted the gestational surrogate status as the legal mother). 
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deal exclusively with requirements for enforcement of gestational-surrogacy 
agreements, leaving traditional arrangements in a legal void.88  
2.  Statutory Reform: The Second Wave of Surrogacy Laws 
The recent statutory reforms in surrogacy law have been driven largely by 
pragmatic concerns. As couples eager to have children have increasingly shown 
themselves ready to turn to surrogates, even when the agreements are of 
uncertain legality, lawmakers have recognized the potential harms posed by the 
lack of regulation. In a legal vacuum, and even when surrogacy contracts are 
prohibited, a host of legal problems can arise regarding the rights and 
obligations of the participants toward the child. Along with the risk of 
acrimonious custody litigation between the surrogate and the intended parents, 
costly uncertainty can result when the intended parents divorce or decline to 
accept the child, perhaps because the baby is born with a medical condition or 
disability. Against this background, many lawmakers concluded that because 
surrogacy arrangements would continue with or without facilitating legislation, 
the appropriate legal response was to establish rules under which parental 
status was clearly prescribed.89 
The Illinois legislation is representative. In 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court 
implored the legislature to safeguard the interests of children born as a result of 
assisted reproduction by clarifying the parental status of the involved adults.90 
The legislature responded in 2004 by passing the Gestational Surrogacy Act 
(GSA). Like other contemporary laws, this statute limits enforcement to 
gestational (and not traditional) surrogacy contracts and mandates that the 
intended parents automatically become the child’s legal parents at birth.91 Also 
like other contemporary statutes, the GSA restricts enforcement to 
arrangements in which the surrogate has given birth before and the intended 
parents have a medical need for the surrogacy.92 But the Illinois law creates a 
more efficient (and less expensive) process than other states by providing a pre-
birth registration process rather than a judicial proceeding to establish the 
status of the intended parents.93 
 
 88. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 299 (2000) (referring only to gestational surrogacy); 750 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2008) (referring only to gestational surrogacy); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045 (2008) (requiring “an egg and sperm from the intended parents”). Some 
states authorize enforcement without distinguishing between gestational and traditional agreements. 
E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. §§ 168-B:1 to -B:32 (2008). 
 89. For example, in 2000, the Uniform Parentage Act provision offering states the option of 
declaring surrogacy agreements void was repealed, on the ground that regulation was essential because 
parties would continue to enter these agreements. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801, 9B U.L.A. 362 
cmt. (2000); see also In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. 2003). 
 90. In re M.J., 787 N.E.2d at 150 (emphasizing that the Illinois Parentage Act, enacted in 1975, did 
not contemplate the new reproductive technologies). 
 91. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15 (2006); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 299 (2000). 
 92. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(a)(2), 20(b)(2) (2006). 
 93. The statute also directs that parentage be determined by a judicial proceeding on the basis of 
the parties’ intent if the parties fail to meet statutory requirements. 47/25(e). Further, it allows contract 
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An account of the 2004 legislative process in Illinois illustrates how much 
the legal and political landscape had changed since the days of Baby M. No 
reports indicate that the bill was challenged as promoting baby selling or that it 
was criticized for being exploitative of women who served as surrogates. 
Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find opposition to the proposed Illinois law.94 
Advocating for the bill were parents’ groups, the Illinois State Bar Association, 
and attorneys who practiced in the area of adoption and assisted reproduction.95 
News coverage was also positive, with reports of warm relationships between 
surrogates and grateful couples, and explanations of how the new law would 
avoid the “horror stories” in which surrogates or intended parents backed out 
of agreements.96 The bill was passed without opposition in both houses of the 
legislature.97 
Despite the equanimity with which the GSA was enacted in Illinois, 
opposition to surrogacy arrangements continues in some quarters. In 2008, the 
Minnesota legislature passed a bill almost identical to the Illinois statute, but in 
the face of stiff opposition from social and religious conservatives, including 
several anti-abortion groups.98 The Catholic Church criticized the bill in 
measured terms, but the Minnesota Family Council called the legislation 
“legalized baby-selling” and charged the statute with promoting single-parent 
and same-sex-parent households.99 Lobbying in favor of the bill were the 
Minnesota State Bar Association and Resolve, an increasingly active 
organization of adults dealing with infertility problems.100 The legislature voted 
almost 2–1 in favor of the bill—which was then vetoed by Republican Governor 
Tim Pawlenty.101 As in Illinois, no evidence indicates that any women’s 
 
terms regulating the surrogate’s behavior in matters that may affect the health of the fetus, including 
compliance with medical advice and abstention from alcohol, tobacco, and nonprescription drugs. 
47/25(d). 
 94. Nidhi Desai, an attorney intimately involved in drafting and proposing the bill, reports that few 
opponents—and no women’s groups—spoke against it. According to Desai, who testified in support of 
the bill, “the members [legislators] had a lot of questions, and they were satisfied with the answers.” 
Telephone Interview with Nidhi Desai, in Chicago, Ill. (July 9, 2008). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Graham, supra note 2 (quoting the bill’s House sponsor: “The idea was to clarify who has 
responsibility for the child born through this process,” and to avoid litigation); see also Rogers, supra 
note 9. 
 97. H.R. Roll Call, H.B. 4962, 93rd Gen. Assem., Third Reading (Ill. 2004) (vote recorded 113–0); 
S. Vote, H.B. 4962, 93rd Gen. Assem., Third Reading (Ill. 2004) (vote recorded 53–0). 
 98. Mike Kaszuba, Group Says Surrogacy Bill Allows for Baby-Selling, MINN. STAR TRIB., Apr. 9, 
2008, at 5B. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See RESOLVE: The National Infertility Association, http://www.resolve.org (last visited Feb. 
1, 2009); see also T.W. Budig, Surrogacy Legislation Fills a Void, Supporters Say, ISANTI COUNTY 
NEWS, Mar. 13, 2008, available at http://isanticountynews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task= 
view&id=2942&Itemid=59 (describing political opposition to and support of the Minnesota bill). 
 101. Andy Birkey, Surrogacy Bill Passes Minnesota Legislature, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, 
May 19, 2008, http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2008/05/16/surrogacy-bill-passes-minnesota-legislature; 
Governor Tim Pawlenty, Letter to James P. Metzen Vetoing the 2008 Surrogacy Gestational Bill, S. 85-
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organizations or civil-liberties groups participated in the legislative process in 
Minnesota. 
The history of surrogacy regulation over the past twenty years presents 
several puzzles. How did one case generate such intense hostility and alarm 
about an arrangement that had attracted little attention until that time? 
Women’s groups and social conservatives seldom ally on matters of 
reproductive choice. How did that alliance form and why was it so short-lived? 
And what are the forces that altered the social meaning and political dynamic of 
surrogacy in a relatively short period? The discussion that follows is intended to 
unravel these puzzles and to shed some light on the social and political framing 
and reframing of surrogacy. 
III 
THE BABY M ERA: MORAL PANIC AND INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS 
The intense interest in surrogacy triggered by the Baby M decision shaped 
the law in ways that have had a lasting impact in many states. This response had 
the flavor of a moral panic that became institutionalized through legislation. 
Because of the drama and salience of the case and the novelty of surrogacy, the 
contracts came to be perceived as a serious threat to core social values, a 
perception that was reinforced by political actors and the media. The framing of 
surrogacy as commodification was shaped and promoted by feminists and 
religious leaders who amplified its social meaning as baby-selling and the 
exploitation of women. These groups were driven by different ideological and 
political goals, but they forged an effective political alliance that played an 
important role in shaping the law for years to come. 
A. Why a Moral Panic? 
Sociologists have long been interested in moral panics, a form of collective 
action in which the public, the media, and political actors reinforce each other 
in an escalating pattern of intense and disproportionate concern in response to 
a perceived social threat.102 Moral panics are often triggered by highly publicized 
events that engender public alarm.103 Typically, hostile attention is focused on a 
particular group of individuals who are deemed responsible for the threat and 
who, it is felt, must be stopped.104 A moral panic is distinguished from a 
straightforward effort to deal with a pressing social problem by the gap between 
perception of the threat and reality.105 In a moral panic, participants exaggerate 
 
2965, 117th Day, at 10378–79 (Minn. 2008), available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/journals/2007-
2008/20080516117.pdf#Page67. 
 102. Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda authored the authoritative analysis of moral panics. 
ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
DEVIANCE (1994). 
 103. Id. at 82. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 31. 
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the seriousness of the threat and the urgency of the need for government action 
in response.106 
On first inspection, the response to Baby M and the opposition to surrogacy 
arrangements that was generated by the case seem somewhat different from the 
classic moral panic. Unlike a school shooting that triggers outraged calls for a 
crackdown on juvenile crime, surrogacy did not inherently represent a social 
evil. Conceivably, during the course of the trial, surrogacy could have taken on 
the more-benign social meaning that it has assumed in recent years. But this did 
not happen. The meaning of surrogacy as baby selling and exploitation of poor 
women crystallized; accordingly, public and political concern about the threat of 
social harm intensified, along with demands for official attention. 
One source of the moral panic surrounding Baby M was an understandable 
(and legitimate, under the circumstances) unease about the new reproductive 
technologies emerging in the 1980s. Although traditional surrogacy of the 
Whitehead–Stern variety was quite low-tech, it was associated in public 
discourse with IVF and cloning—unfamiliar and sophisticated technological 
developments.107 Less than a decade after the birth of Louise Brown, the first 
child conceived through IVF, American society had only begun to contemplate 
the dramatic changes in family formation made possible by technologies that 
allowed genetic, gestational, and social parenting to be disaggregated.108 
Thoughtful people had concerns about these scientific developments that 
seemed to pose a threat to core social values and these concerns likely 
contributed to the framing of surrogacy as commodification.109 Scientific 
innovation raised the possibility of breeding farms and markets in designer 
babies.110 Thus, some of the negative response to Baby M was driven by anxiety 
about the unfamiliar and uncertain risks associated with surrogacy and with the 
new reproductive technologies generally.111 The unhappy outcome of the 
Whitehead–Stern arrangement simply reinforced a general concern that the 
“brave new world” of assisted reproduction was a perilous one. 
Although grounded in legitimate concerns, the response to Baby M in the 
political arena was typical of the way a dynamic interplay among political 
actors, the media, and the public can create and sustain a moral panic. The 
 
 106. Id. at 26, 120. 
 107. See SPAR, supra note 79, at 70. 
 108. Id. at 24, 26–30 (explaining the birth and growth of the “baby market” and discussing Louise 
Brown). 
 109. See generally supra notes 15–16 (describing philosophical arguments against surrogacy). 
 110. For a gripping fictional account, see MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (1985), 
describing a futuristic, patriarchal society where the only role of women is to submissively reproduce 
(although not through reproductive technologies). See generally COREA, supra note 21. 
 111. Both the New York and New Jersey task force reports linked Baby M to social and ethical 
issues raised by new reproductive technologies. See AFTER BABY M, supra note 72, at 1 (New Jersey 
report); SURROGATE PARENTING: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY, supra 
note 58, at 1–2 (New York report). Unfamiliar risks often appear to be more threatening than familiar 
risks. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
683, 783 (1999). 
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media played a key role in maintaining public attention—the troubling story of 
the fight over the child was in the news for more than a year. The story was 
compelling in itself, but it also intensified media and public interest in the 
broader issues surrounding surrogacy, and discussions of the broader issues 
were often linked to the case. In this way, Baby M fueled political and public 
concern as it came to represent the risks posed generally by surrogacy 
arrangements—and perhaps by uses of other novel reproductive technologies as 
well. 
Cognitive psychologists have clarified the mechanisms through which a 
moral panic is generated and sustained by showing how attention directed at a 
particular threat affects individuals’ perceptions about the magnitude of the 
danger.112 Individuals use heuristics, or rules of thumb, to process information 
and assess the importance of particular data; these short-cuts are very useful but 
can lead to systematic biases.113 One such cognitive short-cut, the availability 
heuristic, leads us to overvalue vivid experiential data that can be readily 
brought to mind and to discount the importance of abstract information.114 Thus 
we are likely to judge a readily imaginable event to be more risky than one that 
is remote or not easily contemplated.115 The Baby M story was not 
representative of typical surrogacy arrangements, but it is easy to see how the 
intense media coverage of the acrimonious dispute might have assumed 
disproportionate salience to a person evaluating the social harm of surrogacy, as 
compared to the abstract evidence that most surrogacy arrangements were 
carried out smoothly. Opponents of surrogacy focused on Baby M and a few 
other stories involving unhappy outcomes to underscore the substantial threat 
of harm to children and women posed by these arrangements.116 
Assessments of risk that fuel a moral panic are not simply a matter of 
individual misperceptions. Public concern about the seriousness of a social 
problem is magnified when the threat is repeated and reinforced in public 
discourse, for each re-telling makes the threat more salient. Scholars have called 
this dynamic process an “availability cascade.”117 In the case of surrogacy, 
politicians and other opinion leaders generated and reinforced public interest 
and alarm, using Baby M to frame the issue. Governors Kean and Cuomo, for 
example, spoke out against surrogacy and established task forces in their 
 
 112. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & 
Amos Tversky eds., 1982). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 3, 11. 
 115. Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Fact Versus Fears: Understanding 
Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 112, at 
465. 
 116. Another case frequently cited involved intended parents who allegedly refused to take twin 
babies, insisting that they had only agreed to take one child. THE BUSINESS OF SURROGATE 
PARENTING, supra note 61, at 8. 
 117. See generally Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 111. 
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states.118 Feminists, women’s groups, and religious organizations (especially the 
Catholic Church) stimulated support for Ms. Whitehead and momentum for 
antisurrogacy law reform through courthouse vigils, interviews, petitions, 
newspaper columns, amicus briefs and legislative testimony.119 Ultimately, 
opponents successfully shaped the social meaning of surrogacy as a degrading 
business in which poor women were unfairly exploited and coerced by profit-
seeking brokers to sell their babies. This attention by opinion leaders was fed by 
the media, which, perceiving the public’s interest, continued to give the issue 
substantial coverage; editorial opinion, tracking the attitude of civic and social 
leaders, was almost uniformly hostile to surrogacy and favorable to restriction.120 
Through this process, a powerful narrative defining surrogacy as 
commodification was created and sustained, and the view that “something must 
be done” by the government to respond to the threat was translated into law 
reform in several states. 
Although advocates identified the primary evil of surrogacy as baby selling, 
neither the sellers nor the buyers were cast as the villains of the moral panic 
triggered by Baby M. Instead, opponents targeted the broker intermediaries as 
the evil-doers who must be stopped. Commercial surrogacy was seen as a 
business venture, operated with the goal of making a profit through the 
exploitation of poor women and childless couples.121 Noel Keane, whose 
surrogacy agency was the largest and best-known, was frequently depicted as 
the typical broker—an unsavory opportunist who had grown rich in the baby-
selling business.122 In New York, for example, the Health Department report 
that pointed to the threat posed by Keane and his ilk was the key to mobilizing 
a previously reluctant legislature to pass a strict prohibition with criminal 
sanctions for intermediaries.123 
That other participants in surrogacy arrangements were viewed as less 
culpable is not surprising. Surrogates themselves were depicted sympathetically; 
 
 118. Both advocated for restrictive legislation and played key roles in the political process. 
Beginning in 1989, Governor Cuomo introduced a bill banning surrogacy in each legislative session 
until it was passed in 1992. See sources cited, supra note 60. 
 119. Feminist activism against surrogacy is described supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text. 
Phyllis Chessler played a key role as an opinion leader in mobilizing feminist support. In her book, 
Sacred Bond, she describes the roles of various individuals and groups in building support for Ms. 
Whitehead and opposition to surrogacy. CHESLER, supra note 39, at 71–107. Catholic opposition to 
surrogacy is described supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Editorial, Nothing Surrogate About the Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1987, at A14; see also 
editorials favoring the New York statute cited supra note 63. 
 121. See, e.g., infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 122. See, e.g., id. The New Jersey task force reported that only fourteen agencies existed, of which 
only six had arranged forty or more surrogacies. AFTER BABY M, supra note 72, at 39. Keane operated 
the only sizable agency arranging surrogacy contracts during this period, suggesting the extent to which 
the threat of surrogacy was exaggerated in the midst of the moral panic surrounding Baby M. THE 
BUSINESS OF SURROGATE PARENTING, supra note 61, at 3–8. For an informative description of Keane 
and his role, see Sanger, supra note 35, at 144–49. 
 123. See Curry, supra note 7 (describing the importance of the Health department report as a 
catalyst for the legislation). 
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their decisions to become involved in the reprehensible arrangements were seen 
as coerced by circumstances (and by the brokers) and as ill-informed about the 
consequences. Infertile couples seeking to acquire children fared somewhat less 
well. Surrogacy opponents criticized the Sterns for participating in the 
exploitation of Ms. Whitehead, characterizing them as rich people using their 
superior wealth and social status to indulge their desire for a genetically linked 
child.124 Critics expressed skepticism about Ms. Stern’s claimed medical 
disability, ridiculing her as a woman who put her career first and found child 
bearing inconvenient.125 But, despite these disparaging attacks on the Sterns, the 
vilification of infertile couples seeking to have children through surrogacy 
arrangements did not seem to stick. Most observers likely had some sympathy 
for their plight, seeing the desire to have a child with a biological connection to 
one parent as a natural and understandable, if wrongheaded, impulse.126 Thus, in 
the political arena and in the media, brokers were the villains and parties to 
surrogacy arrangements, on the whole, were described sympathetically. 
B. The Activists for Law Reform: An Unlikely Coalition 
At one level, the legislative reform following Baby M is a straightforward 
story of interest-group politics. In New York, for example, several well-
organized constituencies joined to lobby for the ban on commercial surrogacy, 
while opposition to the bill was weak and not well organized.127 But the coalition 
was a curious one: feminists and civil-liberties groups seldom ally with 
traditional religious organizations—particularly on issues relating to the 
regulation of reproductive choices. For the Catholic Church and other social 
conservatives, political opposition to surrogacy was compatible with broader 
family-policy agendas. This was less clear for civil libertarians, feminists, and 
women’s groups, whose stance on surrogacy seemed to be in tension with their 
commitment to women’s reproductive autonomy—as some feminists recognized 
at the outset.128 Two questions should be addressed: What explains the 
antisurrogacy position taken by feminists and civil-liberties groups? And what 
explains the lack of dissent within these groups in the political arena—given the 
early recognition that the issue was a hard one for feminists? 
 
 124. Pollitt, supra note 34, at 682. 
 125. Id. (“[W]e never found out why Dr. Elizabeth Stern claimed to be infertile on her application . . 
. or why she didn’t confirm that diagnosis until shortly before the case went to trial, much less consult a 
specialist in the management of MS pregnancies.”); Sanger, supra note 35, at 153–54 (“Bill and Betsy 
had never tried to conceive a child together . . . .”). 
 126. AFTER BABY M, supra note 72, at 13–14 (describing infertility data, causes, and prevention); 
SURROGATE PARENTING: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 58, 
at 7–13 (same). 
 127. See supra notes 68–70. The legislative packet includes many letters from organizations 
supporting the statute and only a handful, mostly from individuals, opposed. See Legislative Bill & 
Veto Jacket, supra note 62. 
 128. See Peterson, supra note 31; Peterson, supra note 39. 
06_SCOTT_BOOK PROOF.DOC 11/9/2009  1:22:51 PM 
130 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:109 
1. Conservative Opposition to Surrogacy 
The Catholic Church opposed surrogacy arrangements and supported legal 
prohibition even before Baby M captured national attention. Surrogacy was 
simply one dimension of a larger threat to core Catholic beliefs about family 
formation posed by new reproductive technologies. In 1987, while Baby M was 
in the headlines but not yet decided, the Vatican issued a forceful statement 
condemning surrogacy and explaining that all means of assisted reproduction 
were prohibited under Church doctrine, which requires that children be created 
only through the conjugal union of husband and wife.129 This pronouncement, 
the product of several years of study, specifically called on governments to 
prohibit surrogacy; it was immediately linked to Baby M in news accounts.130 For 
the Church, Baby M provided an opportunity to influence lawmaking on a 
matter of grave moral and doctrinal importance, and the Church’s active efforts 
to frame surrogacy as commodification and to influence its regulation rested on 
this religious foundation.131 
More generally, opposition to surrogacy arrangements was (and is) 
compatible with the family-values agenda of religious and social conservatives. 
Indeed, the views of pro-life activists about abortion and motherhood also 
illuminate their hostility to surrogacy arrangements. In her important study of 
abortion activists, Kristin Luker found that many abortion opponents were 
women who saw sexuality, pregnancy, and motherhood within traditional 
marriage as the essential core of women’s identity.132 These women viewed pro-
choice advocates as careerists whose efforts to control fertility undermined the 
family and devalued women’s most important role.133 It is easy to see how these 
attitudes might translate into hostility toward surrogacy and toward career 
women like Ms. Stern. For religious and social conservatives, surrogacy 
arrangements represented a threat to the traditional family and to women’s 
roles as wives and mothers, whereas Ms. Whitehead’s urgent desire to keep her 
child was a “natural mother’s instinct” that should be respected.134 
 
 129. Ratzinger, supra note 37. The statement, authored by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (the current 
Pope Benedict XVI) was initiated in the early 1980s by Pope John Paul II, out of concern that new 
reproductive technologies were inconsistent with traditional religious norms. See also Bernard Lo, 
Vatican Statement on Life Is a Start, Not an Answer, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1987, at 5 (describing the 
Church’s statement); Roberto Suro, Vatican’s Moral Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1987, at A1 (“[The 
Vatican’s statement] exploits what some church officials consider an unparalleled opportunity to 
influence governments before they enact laws on controversial medical innovations.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Church Hits Surrogacy, supra note 37. 
 131. An amicus curiae brief submitted to the New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby M by the New 
Jersey Catholic Conference stated that surrogacy is “a new form of prostitution, . . . traffic[king] for 
profit in human lives,” degrading women, and “dehumaniz[ing] children.” Craig McCoy, N.J. Bishops 
Decry Surrogate Parenting as Prostitution, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 16, 1987, at B1. 
 132. See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 194–208 
(1984). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 160. 
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2. Opposition to Surrogacy by Women’s Advocates 
This account of the motivation of conservative opponents of surrogacy does 
little to illuminate the response of most feminists. A core part of the feminist 
political agenda has been vigilant resistance to the notion that the government, 
and not women themselves, should control reproductive decisions. One might 
have expected that some pro-choice advocates would support allowing women 
to make their own decisions about entering surrogacy arrangements. And in 
fact, early in the Baby M trial, some feminists expressed reservations about the 
political agenda of those supporting Ms. Whitehead, arguing that paternalistic 
restrictions on surrogacy contracts were dangerous incursions into women’s 
procreative freedom.135 But advocates with this view ultimately played little role 
in the political process. 
The prevailing feminist position opposing surrogacy was compatible, to an 
extent, with core feminist commitments to gender equality and control over 
reproduction, and with a general concern that women not be defined by their 
reproductive capacity. First, for many feminists, surrogacy represented yet 
another context in which women were valued primarily for their sexual and 
reproductive capacities rather than for their intellect and skills. One feminist 
compared the surrogate to “human potting soil for the man’s seed.”136 To her 
(and to others), the practice of surrogacy was designed to satisfy men’s desire 
for children—or for profit, in the case of brokers like Noel Keane—and the 
arrangements relegated women to the low-status job of “baby maker.”137 
Moreover, many feminists implicitly framed the issue of control over 
reproduction by focusing not on the decision to enter the surrogacy contract, 
but on the decision to relinquish the child.138 In this view, the woman’s 
reproductive choice was not to act as a surrogate, but to keep the baby, a 
decision that powerful men (such as Mr. Stern, Mr. Keane, and Judge Sorkow) 
were seeking to override. For these feminists, it was troubling that the bond 
between a mother and her child that developed during pregnancy could be 
 
 135. E.g., Lorraine Sorrel, Baby M Again, OFF OUR BACKS: A WOMEN’S NEWSJOURNAL, July 31, 
1987, at 26. Sorrel argued that Ms. Whitehead should be held to her contract or else women’s abilities 
to make reproductive decisions would be threatened and motherhood would be unduly sanctified so 
women could not assume other roles. Opponents of surrogacy and supporters of Ms. Whitehead noted 
the reluctance of feminists to get on board. E.g., CHESLER, supra note 39, at 22, 34 (noting feminist 
claims that a woman should have the right to control the use of her body, and arguments that 
“patriarchal motherhood” has taken away the sanctity of biological reproduction); Pollitt, supra note 
34, at 685 (“Some women argue that to allow Ms. Whitehead to back out of her pledge would be to 
stigmatize all women as irrational and incapable of adulthood under the law.”). A few feminist legal 
scholars also argued for enforcement of surrogacy contracts. See, e.g., Lori Andrews, Surrogate 
Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 72, 78 (1988) (arguing that it 
is sexist and classist to assume that poor women cannot make educated reproductive choices). 
 136. Pollitt, supra note 34, at 688. 
 137. Id. at 687–88. 
 138. See e.g., Katherine Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L. J. 293, 333–34 (1988); Vicki 
C. Jackson, Baby M and the Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO. L. J. 1811, 1818–20 (1988). 
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severed coercively on the basis of a contract.139 In general, for feminists who 
focused on the mother–child relationship as a core concern of feminism, the 
threat to this bond posed by surrogacy contracts was of primary importance.140 
These arguments against surrogacy reflected genuine feminist concerns, but 
they rested, at least in part, on an assumption that decisions by women to enter 
surrogacy contracts were not autonomous choices that should be enforced. As a 
general proposition, most feminists presume that women are capable of 
assessing their own interests and making decisions in pursuit of their goals. One 
could imagine a narrative in which a woman decides that, in entering a 
surrogacy contract, she will be performing a useful service for the intended 
parents while furthering her own interests and those of her family—by earning 
money while caring for her children at home, for example.141 In this narrative, 
surrogates are rational, self-interested actors—and should be held to their 
promises upon which others rely. Feminists opposing surrogacy implicitly 
rejected such a narrative because they believed that some dimensions of a 
surrogate’s decisionmaking process were seriously flawed.142 
Feminists saw two problems with surrogacy contracts that weighed against 
enforcement and in favor of a ban. First, they argued that surrogates’ decisions 
were made under duress; this concern is captured in the frequent claim that 
these contracts exploited women.143 In their view, surrogates were women with 
few options for meeting compelling financial needs, which made them 
vulnerable to exploitation by intermediaries.144 As the New Jersey Supreme 
Court noted in Baby M, this concern also arises in the context of adoption, in 
which it is the rationale for not allowing intermediaries to receive payment for 
adoption placement and for prohibiting pre-birth consent to adoption by birth 
mothers.145 In the context of surrogacy, in which the exigencies are less urgent, 
 
 139. Bartlett, supra note 138, at 333 (“[Surrogacy] presupposes that the biological mother–child 
bond is easily severed, that pregnancy and childbirth is a process which does not necessarily entail 
enduring human emotion and permanent connectedness, that women can have children and give them 
up if the price is right . . . .”); Jackson, supra note 138, at 1818–20. 
 140. This points to a division within feminist theory. Liberal feminists have tended to emphasize 
gender equality and focus on women as autonomous individuals, while relational (or “difference”) 
feminists emphasize women’s nurturing and relational tendencies, which distinguish them from men. 
See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S 
DEVELOPMENT (1982). Martha Fineman argues that lawmakers should protect the “mother-child 
dyad” as the core family relationship. See generally MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, 
THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995). 
 141. Many surrogates who are happy with their involvement in surrogacy arrangements offer this 
description of their decision. See Kelley, supra note 9; Schulte, supra note 9. 
 142. See Pollitt, supra note 34, at 685 (“If [commercial surrogacy] becomes a socially acceptable way 
for a wife to help out the family budget, how can the law protect women from being coerced into 
contracts by their husbands?”). 
 143. E.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 81–82; Pollitt, supra note 34, at 684–85. 
 144. Pollitt, supra note 34, at 688 (arguing that if surrogacy contracts were unenforceable, the “real 
loser . . . would be the baby-broker . . . and that would be a very good thing”). 
 145. See In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241, 1244–45 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987) (noting the 
risks of “baby-bartering” when intermediaries accept money for arranging adoptions; construing “the 
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this claim may assume that most women would not agree to undertake what is 
seen as a degrading service were it not for their extreme need and lack of other 
opportunities to earn money. This theme is also heard in arguments against 
legalizing prostitution, an issue that has generated considerable debate among 
feminists.146 Alternatively, surrogates who willingly entered these arrangements 
believing that they were performing a valuable service were considered likely to 
be subject to self deception generated by a patriarchal society.147 
Many feminists also viewed surrogacy contracts to be defective for lack of 
informed consent, because women entering surrogacy contracts often would not 
be able to anticipate the substantial risk that they would later regret the 
agreement to give up the child. Surrogates might not understand that they were 
likely to form a bond with their children during pregnancy that could make 
relinquishment extremely difficult.148 Scholars have described limits on an 
individual’s ability to anticipate future emotional reactions, arguing that 
deficiencies in “affective forecasting” undermine informed decisionmaking and 
may justify non-enforcement of agreements.149 In the context of surrogacy, many 
opponents argued that the risk of regret by the surrogate was very great—and 
was a good reason not to allow the agreements.150 
 
child named therein” in New Jersey’s adoption statutes to refer only to a child that has been born, not 
to a fetus or a planned child); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3-39.1, -41 (West 2008) (adoption statute 
prohibiting payment to intermediary for placement of a child for adoption). 
 146. Some feminists favor banning prostitution, as a degrading occupation that exploits women and 
values them only for their sexuality. But others argue that women should be free to decide to engage in 
sexual activity for profit and oppose paternalistic regulation. Compare Catherine A. MacKinnon, 
Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. REV. 793 (1991) (favoring regulation), with 
NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS (1995) (opposing restrictions). 
 147. Margaret Radin argues that surrogates who feel fulfilled in the role may be subject to “ironic 
self deception,” and “may actually be reinforcing oppressive gender roles.” Intended mothers also are 
potentially subject to “false consciousness,” believing they should raise their partners’ genetic children. 
See Radin, supra note 16, at 1930–31. 
 148. MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES 71–72 
(1988) (discussing the difficulty some surrogates have in parting with a baby); Bartlett, supra note 138, 
at 333 (describing the bond that develops during pregnancy); Jackson, supra note 138, at 1819 (“[I]t 
may be quite difficult, even impossible, accurately to evaluate, prior to birth, the ability to surrender 
the child.”); Linda J. Lacey, The Law of Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Parenthood in 
Oklahoma: Roadblocks to the Right to Procreate, 22 TULSA L.J. 281, 317 (1987) (arguing that because 
woman cannot know the pain of separating with a child, “she should not be bound to a provision 
forcing her to relinquish the child”); Pollitt, supra note 34, at 684. 
 149. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problem of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. 
L.J. 155, 209–11 (2005) (arguing that individuals often inaccurately forecast future emotional states, and 
that this deficiency is a reason not to enforce surrogacy contracts); Jackson, supra note 138, at 1819 
(arguing that women may not anticipate regret about relinquishing a child); Molly J. Walker Wilson, 
Precommitment in Free-Market Procreation: Surrogacy, Commissioned Adoption, and Limits on 
Human Decision Making Capacity, 31 J. LEGIS. 329, 329–30 (2005) (arguing that consent can never be 
informed because a woman cannot accurately predict how she will feel when giving the child up to the 
intended parents). 
 150. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 16, at 1930. 
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The prediction that many women would regret their decisions to enter 
surrogacy contracts gained force, in part, because the issue was first considered 
in the context of Baby M, in which the surrogate did experience great regret. 
Feminists are as susceptible to the availability heuristic as anyone else, and it 
seems likely that vivid images of Ms. Whitehead’s anguish at being separated 
from her child influenced their views. The argument that women should have 
the freedom to make these decisions might have gained greater traction with 
some feminists had the issue not been complicated by the unfortunate outcome 
in Baby M. But the prediction also resonated for some feminists because regret 
in this context seemed like a mother’s natural response. The notion that the 
typical surrogate would coolly relinquish her child conflicted with an ideology 
of motherhood under which pregnancy was seen as a unique experience 
through which a “sacred bond” develops between mother and child.151 In this 
way at least, feminist concerns about surrogacy overlapped with those of social 
conservatives.152 
In sum, many feminists viewed surrogacy transactions as inherently 
degrading to women; they assumed that the contracts were executed because 
women were coerced by exigent circumstances or false consciousness and 
because they could not anticipate the adverse consequences of their choices. 
For these reasons, feminists in the political arena argued either that surrogacy 
arrangements should be prohibited or that women should not be bound by 
these contracts.  
There is another piece to the puzzle of feminists’ active involvement in the 
political movement to prohibit surrogacy arrangements. The evidence indicates 
that feminists coalesced in support of Ms. Whitehead and against surrogacy 
because they saw the case as typical of contested custody disputes in which 
loving mothers lost their children to more-powerful fathers. Although the legal 
issue in Baby M was whether the surrogacy contract should be enforced, in 
many ways, the trial played out as a custody adjudication between the biological 
parents, with much expert testimony about which party would be a better 
parent to the child.153 Feminists and women’s groups mobilized in response to 
their perception that Ms. Whitehead’s parenting abilities were being unfairly 
scrutinized and criticized, while Mr. Stern was presumed to be competent to 
assume the parental role, despite his lack of experience.154 
 
 151. Phyllis Chesler, a leading surrogacy activist, titled her book about Baby M, “Sacred Bond.” 
CHESLER, supra note 39; see also Bartlett, supra note 138, at 333–34 (discussing the assumption that a 
strong mother–child bond will be formed during pregnancy as part of the ideology of custody law and 
challenging the wisdom of facilitating the severance of that relationship for cash); Pollitt, supra note 34, 
at 684 (“Within custody law, there is a strong ideology that through pregnancy and childbirth an 
enduring bond develops between mother and child which cannot easily be broken.”). 
 152. See LUKER, supra note 132, at 197–215 (describing religious conservatives’ attitude about the 
importance of motherhood in women’s identity). 
 153. See Peterson, supra note 31 and sources cited supra note 34 (describing objections to criticisms 
of Ms. Whitehead’s parenting skills). 
 154. See Peterson, supra note 31 and sources cited supra note 34. 
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Child-custody decisionmaking was an important issue on the feminist 
agenda in the 1980s. The “tender years” presumption favoring mothers over 
fathers in custody disputes had been replaced in most states by the gender-
neutral “best interest of the child” standard.155 Although the empirical evidence 
is mixed, feminists argued that under the best-interest standard, primary-
caretaker mothers often lost adjudicated custody disputes to wealthier, more-
powerful fathers.156 Many antisurrogacy feminists saw the Whitehead–Stern 
dispute as one more example of mothers’ losing struggle to keep their children 
in an unfair patriarchal system.157 Phyllis Chesler, a long-time critic of the legal 
system’s treatment of mothers in child-custody cases, was one of the most active 
feminist supporters of Ms. Whitehead and a determined advocate for banning 
surrogacy arrangements. She explicitly framed the case as a typical custody 
dispute riddled with gender bias, with the predictable trial-court decision.158 
Many feminists in the political arena appear to have conflated surrogacy and 
child custody in the context of this compelling case. In opposing these 
transactions generally, they may have assumed that such biased proceedings 
would be the norm if surrogacy contracts were allowed.  
Although surrogacy was sometimes described as a hard issue for feminists, 
ultimately women’s groups spoke virtually with one voice in the political arena 
during the Baby M period and thereafter for several years.159 Given the 
complexity of the issues and the early divisions among feminists, this lack of 
dissent warrants some examination. 
The literature on public-opinion formation and expression offers an 
explanation of this unified response. Timur Kuran argues that when expressions 
of public opinion coalesce around a dominant position, individuals whose 
preferences are inconsistent with that view may be silenced through a 
mechanism that he calls a “reputational cascade.”160 This happens, according to 
 
 155. Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child 
Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 235, 236 (1982). 
 156. See id. (citing studies showing fathers winning between 38% and 63% of disputed custody 
cases). Overall, about 10% of children were in their fathers’ custody in the early 1990s. ELEANOR E. 
MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF 
CUSTODY 168 (1992). 
 157. See Peterson, supra note 31 (describing feminists’ anger at the trial and the expert testimony 
about Whitehead). 
 158. CHESLER, supra note 39, at 11, 16, 97. The year before the trial court’s decision in Baby M, 
Chesler published a study of custody trials that focused on mothers who lost custody. PHYLLIS 
CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN AND CUSTODY (1986). 
 159. See supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text. Although few feminist opponents of surrogacy 
regulation spoke out in the political arena, some academic feminists argued against restrictions on 
surrogacy agreements. See Andrews, supra note 135, at 74–76 (challenging feminist arguments based on 
exploitation and risk of regret); Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based 
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 346 (1990) (arguing for 
contractual enforcement of surrogacy agreements because effecting parties’ intentions advances gender 
equality). 
 160. See generally TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1995) [hereinafter KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS]; Timur Kuran, Ethic 
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Kuran, because individuals seek to avoid the social disapproval and censure 
that may follow the expression of an unpopular view.161 As support for a 
dominant view gains force, the cost of dissent rises, and individuals with 
nuanced or even opposing views may be reluctant to speak out.162 Reluctance 
may be particularly likely for those who identify generally with the perspective 
of opinion leaders or who are reluctant to affiliate with opponents.163 This 
response can contribute to the impression that public opinion supporting the 
dominant position is stronger than is in fact the case.164 In a circular process, this 
makes dissent appear to be even more costly and reinforces the perception that 
the prevailing opinion represents a strong social consensus.165 
This analysis may suggest why feminists with reservations about support for 
Ms. Whitehead and the antisurrogacy reforms did not push their views in the 
political arena. In the midst of the moral panic surrounding Baby M, activists 
and opinion leaders such as Chesler moved quickly and successfully to frame 
surrogacy as an exploitative practice that posed a substantial threat to women 
and to motherhood. Feminists who contemplated challenging this position 
might well have anticipated that they would incur substantial reputational costs. 
As the antisurrogacy availability cascade gained momentum, a more tolerant 
stance may have become uncomfortable for feminist skeptics. To oppose 
restrictions on surrogacy was to be antiwoman, allied with brokers and fathers 
against poor mothers and other feminists. Not surprisingly perhaps, in this 
political environment, few feminists openly expressed reservations about 
policies restricting the freedom of parties to enter surrogacy arrangements, 
although at a theoretical level such policies might be seen to be in tension with 
feminist values.166 
IV 
THE COLLAPSE OF COMMODIFICATION: REFRAMING SURROGACY 
Since the early 1990s, surrogacy has been largely reframed as a social and 
political issue, setting the stage for contemporary lawmakers to approach these 
arrangements pragmatically rather than punitively. Several factors have 
contributed to the change. First, the moral panic surrounding Baby M 
predictably dissipated, creating an environment more open to reflective 
consideration of surrogacy regulation. Surrogacy and the new reproductive 
 
Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J.L. STUDIES 623 (1998). See also 
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 111, at 727–29. 
 161. KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, supra note 160, at 60–69. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 60–69, 105–10. 
 165. Id. 
 166. One exception was academic Lori Andrews, who spoke out in support of the trial court’s 
decision. See Editorial, Baby M Decision Spurs Wide Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1987, at E1 (noting 
Andrews’ support of the Baby M decision granting custody to the Sterns); see also Andrews, supra note 
135. 
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technologies became more familiar and, with familiarity, have seemed less 
threatening. This happened in part because the predicted harms of commercial 
surrogacy have largely failed to materialize, so claims of commodification no 
longer seem as compelling as they once did. The framing of surrogacy as baby 
selling has also lost force as traditional surrogacy has been supplanted by 
gestational surrogacy in recent years.167 Finally, whatever its theoretical merits, 
the commodification argument against commercial surrogacy may have become 
unpalatable for feminists and liberals in the political arena because pro-life 
advocates have used uncomfortably similar women-protective arguments 
successfully in favor of restricting abortion. The withdrawal of women’s 
advocates has altered the political dynamic, as has the growth of prosurrogacy 
interest groups who frame surrogacy as a socially beneficial practice. 
A. The Dissipation of the Moral Panic: The Changing Political Climate 
Moral panics always diminish in intensity over time as the salient incidents 
and images that stirred alarm recede in public consciousness.168 Thus, 
predictably, after the New Jersey Supreme Court decision, public interest in 
surrogacy and outrage about baby selling and the exploitation of women 
gradually waned as the media, politicians, and the public turned their attention 
to other matters. The New York legislative reform in 1992 briefly revived 
interest in the issue, with advocates again invoking images of Baby M. But 
interest quickly declined again and, by 1994, sponsors of a New Jersey law 
banning surrogacy could not even generate enough interest to bring the bill 
before the legislature.169 
Moral panics sometimes recur periodically as new incidents revive public 
fears, but this has not happened in the case of surrogacy. Occasionally, horror 
stories of surrogacy agreements gone awry are reported in the press, but even 
the 1995 murder of a baby by his abusive, genetic father shortly after the child 
was relinquished by the surrogate failed to generate a political backlash.170 In 
recent years, no interest group has sought to create a new availability cascade 
with the goal of mobilizing support for new restrictions on the practice. 
In part, this relative quietude simply reflects a growing familiarity with 
surrogacy and other reproductive technologies that were new in the 1980s and 
therefore frightening to many people. Familiarity has assuaged fears about the 
potential of these scientific innovations to undermine conventional 
understandings of marriage, family formation, and human identity. This 
response was not unique to surrogacy or to the 1980s. For example, 
pharmaceutical contraceptives were greeted with alarm when they were 
 
 167. See Sanger, supra note 35, at 140. 
 168. GOODE & BEN-YEHUDA, supra note 102, at 38 (describing how moral panics erupt and 
subside quickly). 
 169. Diamond, supra note 73. 
 170. See Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of America, Inc., 700 A.2d 453, 455–56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) 
(wrongful-death action by the surrogate mother against the infertility clinic that screened the father). 
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introduced in the 1930s but gradually gained public acceptance as helpful family 
planning aids.171 As surrogacy arrangements and other means of assisted 
reproduction lost their novelty, public concern about their potential threat 
diminished and the social environment was no longer conducive to generating 
intense opposition. 
B. Undermining the Commodification Frame 
In large part, familiarity with surrogacy arrangements alleviated public fears 
because many predictions of harmful consequences made by opponents in the 
midst of the Baby M controversy proved to be exaggerated or wrong, 
undermining the characterization of commercial-surrogacy contracts as 
exploitative, baby-selling transactions. At one level, of course, the harms of 
commodification are abstract and not subject to empirical validation. How 
could it be determined whether surrogacy has changed the way that children or 
women’s reproductive capacity is valued? But little evidence confirms the 
predictions of more concrete harms associated with the “sale” of children and 
the exploitation of women who act as surrogates. Since the mid-1990s, the 
empirical research and anecdotal accounts in the media have offered a more 
benign account of surrogacy than that which prevailed earlier, assuaging fears 
about these transactions.172 
Here is the picture that emerges. Most American surrogates are not as 
wealthy as the intended parents, but few are poor.173 Many report using the 
money they receive to enhance their families’ welfare in conventional ways, 
often indicating that they value the ability to earn money while staying home 
with their children.174 Further, few surrogates report reluctance to relinquish the 
child, and a very small percentage express regret about having served in the 
role.175 Contrary to the claim that surrogacy degrades motherhood and 
pregnancy, the available evidence suggests that surrogates view themselves as 
 
 171. Contraceptives were seen as a serious threat to the family, and calls for banning the drugs were 
common. Debora L. Spar, For Love and Money: The Political Economy of Commercial Surrogacy, 12 
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 287, 305–06 (2005). 
 172. Hazel Basilington, The Social Organization of Surrogacy: Relinquishing a Baby and the Role of 
Payment in the Psychological Detachment Process, 7 J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 57 (2002) (study of attitudes 
toward relinquishment); Janice C. Ciccarreli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An 
Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 21 (2005) (reviewing studies of 
surrogacy); see also popular media sources cited supra note 9. 
 173. Kelley, supra note 9. However, Indian women, who indeed may be poor, also serve as 
surrogates for American couples. See Abigail Haworth, Surrogate Mothers: Wombs to Rent, MARIE 
CLAIRE, available at http://www.marieclaire.com/world-reports/news/international/surrogate-mothers-
india (last visited May 8, 2009). 
 174. Kelley, supra note 9 (describing military wives with husbands away on active duty volunteering 
to act as surrogates). 
 175. See Ciccarreli & Beckman, supra note 172, at 31–32 (describing studies showing most 
surrogates reported satisfaction with experience); Kelley, supra note 9. 
06_SCOTT_BOOK PROOF.DOC 11/9/2009  1:22:51 PM 
Summer 2009] SURROGACY AND THE POLITICS OF COMMODIFICATION 139 
performing a service of great social value for the benefit of others.176 Further, 
little evidence indicates that children born of surrogacy arrangements suffer 
psychological or physical harm because of the circumstances of their birth, or 
that surrogates’ other children fear that they too will be relinquished.177 Melissa 
Stern herself appears to have bonded securely with her intended parents; as an 
adult, she reportedly terminated Ms. Whitehead’s parental rights so that Ms. 
Stern could adopt her.178 The evidence tends to support the argument of 
prosurrogacy advocates that infertile couples eager to have children are not 
likely to be seriously deficient parents. 
With the passing of time, it became clear that bad outcomes like that of 
Baby M were exceptional rather than typical, and that the cases that generated 
alarm could usually be avoided through clear legal rules and requirements 
aimed at protecting all participants. For example, disputes of various kinds over 
parental rights and responsibilities (including custody battles and efforts by one 
or both intended parents to default on the surrogacy contract and on their 
parental obligations) are less likely to arise under laws that clearly assign 
parental status to the intended parents at birth. Further, concerns about undue 
influence by brokers or intended parents and about the voluntariness of 
surrogates’ consent and their emotional suitability can be mitigated through 
well-designed regulations. 
C. Gestational Contracts: From Surrogate Mothers to Gestational Carriers 
The prevalence of gestational surrogacy in recent years has been a very 
important factor in dismantling the commodification frame and in changing the 
way many people, including lawmakers and lobbyists, view these arrangements. 
Today, ninety-five percent of surrogacy contracts involve IVF, so most 
surrogates are not the genetic mothers of the children they bear.179 As described 
earlier, several contemporary laws limit access to procedures for efficiently 
establishing intended parent’s rights to gestational-surrogacy contracts, and 
courts typically give intended parents’ claims more weight when the surrogate is 
not the child’s genetic parent. The evidence suggests that surrogates themselves 
see this distinction as important in defining their relationships with the children 
they will relinquish. As one gestational surrogate put it, “I don’t feel that 
motherly bond. I feel more like a caring baby sitter.”180 
 
 176. Ciccarreli & Beckman, supra note 172, at 29–30 (describing surrogates reported altruistic 
motivation); Sanger, supra note 35, at 137 (noting that many women are honored and happy to serve as 
surrogates for infertile couples). 
 177. No studies exist on children conceived using surrogacy. Studies of children conceived by other 
forms of assisted reproduction suggest that the circumstances of birth do not negatively affect 
development. Ciccarreli & Beckman, supra note 172, at 37. 
 178. Jennifer Weiss, Now It’s Melissa’s Time, N.J. MONTHLY MAG., Mar. 2007, available at http:// 
www.reproductivelawyer.com/news/babym.asp. In her only interview, Melissa offered warm praise of 
her parents, Bill and Betsy Stern. Id. 
 179. Sanger, supra note 35, at 140. 
 180. See Kelley, supra note 9. 
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The move to gestational surrogacy has facilitated the change in the social 
meaning of surrogacy from a mother’s sale of her baby to a transaction 
involving the provision of gestational services. It is telling that gestational 
surrogates are often described as “carriers,” rather than as “mothers.”181 
Although some have challenged the commodification argument all along on the 
ground that fathers who execute surrogacy contracts cannot “buy” their own 
children, 182 this objection gained little traction as long as mothers were seen as 
selling their children. Because the gestational surrogate lacks a biological 
connection with the child she is nurturing and bearing, her identity as the child’s 
mother is less powerful.183 The conclusion that the child is not in fact her child, 
but rather that she is providing contractual gestational services to the “actual” 
parents, resonates with many people.184 
This change in social meaning seems to have evolved in a two-step process. 
In Calvert, the first important gestational surrogacy case, both intended parents 
were the child’s genetic parents. This carried great weight with the court and 
made the intended mothers’ claim of parental status compelling.185 Soon, 
however, many state laws granted parental status to intended parents under 
gestational-surrogacy arrangements even when only one intended parent was 
the child’s genetic parent.186 Thus it appears that gestational surrogacy has 
reshaped the social meaning of these arrangements by diminishing the maternal 
 
 181. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1270 (D. Utah 2002) (describing surrogate’s services as 
“a gestational carrier surrogate” ); Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1137 
(Mass. 2001) (referring to the surrogate as the “gestational carrier”); see also Noa Ben-Asher, The 
Curing Law: On the Legal Evolution of Baby-Making Markets 30 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 08-167), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095448 
(arguing the importance of this distinction). 
 182. Richard A. Eptein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 
2305, 2331 (2005) (pointing out that child is father’s own child); Barbara Katz Rothman, Reproductive 
Technologies and Surrogacy: A Feminist Perspective, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1599, 1603 (1992) 
(describing but challenging this argument). 
 183. In the floor debate in the Illinois House, Barbara Currie, the sponsor of the GSA, reassured 
her colleagues: “In a situation where the birth mother . . . provided the egg that results in this baby, 
there is no way you can’t grant her the opportunity to change her mind at the 11th hour. But the 
woman in a gestational surrogacy program . . . has no biological connection to the child.” H.R. 111, 93rd 
Gen. Assem., 22, at 23 (Ill. 2004). 
 184. Legal scholars have also drawn a distinction between traditional and gestational surrogacy. See 
Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of 
Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 898 (2000) (arguing that traditional surrogacy agreements 
should be subject to the same legal standard as adoption because the surrogate is in fact the child’s 
mother, but that the surrogate has no similar claim in a gestational-surrogacy agreement). 
 185. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781–83 (Cal. 1993); see supra notes 81–87 and accompanying 
text. 
 186. Most gestational surrogacy statutes require that one intended parent be the child’s genetic 
parent; a few, including North Dakota, require both intended parents to be genetic parents. Compare 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(b)(1) (2006) (intended parents must “contribute at least one of the gametes 
resulting in a pre-embryo that the gestational surrogate will attempt to carry to term”), with N.D. 
CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 (2008) (“‘Gestational carrier’ means an adult woman who enters into an 
agreement to have an embryo implanted in her and bear the resulting child for intended parents, where 
the embryo is conceived by using the egg and sperm of the intended parents.”). 
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credentials of the surrogate, rather than by enhancing those of the intended 
mother. This is interesting and a bit puzzling, given that critics of surrogacy 
have often emphasized the mother–child bond formed in pregnancy as the 
foundation of the surrogate’s parental claim and the source of her predictable 
regret in relinquishing the child.187 
The relatively positive response to gestational surrogacy suggests that 
gestational motherhood is devalued when it is separated from genetic 
parenthood—and perhaps that surrogates who are not also genetic mothers, 
unlike traditional surrogates, might be expected not to form a maternal bond 
with a child who “belongs” to others.188 This widespread reaction goes some 
distance toward explaining the reframing of surrogacy, but it has some troubling 
implications. First, it raises questions about the value of pregnancy relative to 
other dimensions of motherhood and the extent to which the mother–child 
bond formed during this period is assumed to be a product of the genetic tie 
rather than of the nurturing relationship.189 It also recalls a long-rejected notion 
that parents have a property-like interest in their children based on biology. 
Nonetheless, it seems clear that the supplanting of traditional surrogacy by 
gestational contracts has contributed to public acceptance of surrogacy 
arrangements. 
The benign framing of gestational surrogacy has been reinforced further 
under new statutory requirements that intended parents demonstrate a medical 
need for surrogacy.190 In the Baby M period, surrogacy was sometimes 
characterized as a self-indulgent effort by wealthy couples to avoid the 
inconvenience of pregnancy and childbirth.191 The medical-need requirement 
signals the parents’ legitimate purpose in turning to surrogacy and underscores 
the value of the service as an essential means of achieving a widely shared goal 
of having genetically related children.192 
The availability of gestational surrogacy also has had a tangible effect on 
surrogacy practice. The disaggregation of gestational from genetic parenthood 
 
 187. See sources cited supra note 148. 
 188. Some feminists argue that maternity rests on nurturance in pregnancy and not the genetic tie. 
See generally BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989). 
 189. Critics of surrogacy often emphasize the importance of the mother–child relationship formed 
during pregnancy in arguing against contract enforcement. See Bartlett, supra note 138, at 333–34; Katz 
Rothman, supra note 182, at 1607 (emphasizing the importance of pregnancy as social relationship 
between surrogate and child). 
 190. FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2008) (intended mother must be unable to safely carry a baby to term); 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2006) (“[H]e, she, or they have a medical need for the gestational 
surrogacy . . . .”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §160.756(b)(2) (2008) (A court may only validate a 
gestational surrogacy agreement if “medical evidence provided shows that the intended mother is 
unable to carry a pregnancy to term.”). 
 191. See supra note 125 (describing skeptical comments about Ms. Stern’s motivation in pursuing 
surrogacy). 
 192. See Ben-Asher, supra note 181, at 34–42 (arguing that reproductive technologies (including 
surrogacy) become socially accepted when they are viewed as cures for infertility). 
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has increased both the demand for surrogacy and the willingness of women to 
fill this role. Prospective parents may be more willing to enter these 
arrangements than traditional ones because they can exercise greater control 
over their child’s genetic make-up.193 Further, their “requirements” in choosing 
surrogates are simpler—good health and a willingness to live a healthy lifestyle 
during the pregnancy. At the same time, more women are willing to be 
surrogates when it does not mean giving up their biological children. 
D. The Withdrawal of Feminists and Liberals: Coercion as a Double-Edged 
Sword 
Among the most notable changes in the political landscape of surrogacy in 
recent years has been the absence of feminist voices, women’s groups, and civil-
liberties organizations. Although it is difficult to find direct evidence of a 
change of heart on this issue or an explanation of why it happened, it seems 
likely that changes in the politics of abortion may have played an important 
role. 
The feminist position on surrogacy in the Baby M period always seemed to 
be in tension with the commitment to preserving women’s autonomy in other 
reproductive contexts—particularly abortion. The claim that women lacked 
agency because of coercive circumstances was unsettling, but even more-
discordant with feminist values was the assertion that women needed protection 
because they could not anticipate their response to pregnancy. Such an 
assertion suggested views about the power of female biology that historically 
contributed to women’s subordination—views that feminists have challenged in 
fighting for gender equality. The prediction that women were likely to regret 
their surrogacy decision on the basis of “natural” biological and psychological 
urges embodied essentialist assumptions about the role of motherhood in 
women’s lives.194 
At the time of Baby M, these concerns hovered in the background, the 
source of unease for a few liberal feminists, but were overwhelmed by support 
for Ms. Whitehead and opposition to surrogacy. In recent years, however, 
arguments against surrogacy based on the threat of coercion and regret have 
become untenable for most feminists because anti-abortion advocates have 
invoked similar arguments. Recognizing that many people were offended by 
their standard “baby killing” argument, abortion opponents began to shift to 
what Reva Siegel calls a “women-protective” rationale for banning abortion.195 
 
 193. SPAR, supra note 79, at 78–82. (“[O]nce IVF raised the prospect of selling eggs apart from 
pregnancy, supply began to grow.”). 
 194. See generally Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001) (describing and challenging the central importance of motherhood in 
legal-feminist thought). 
 195. Reva Siegel, The Rights’ Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Women-Protective 
Anti-Abortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1642 (2008) (describing the “women-protective” rationale 
in the Carhart decision). 
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This argument has gained traction in the political arena and in litigation—it was 
endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Carhart in 2007 as a 
justification for restricting abortion.196 
The women-protective argument includes two distinct but related claims: 
First, abortion opponents argue that boyfriends, family, and clinic staff coerce 
and mislead women to obtain abortions that they would never voluntarily 
obtain—because “[it] is so far outside the normal conduct of a mother to 
implicate herself in the killing her own child.”197 Second, and for the same 
reason, opponents argue that many women deeply regret their abortions, 
suffering from psychological trauma which puts them at risk for severe 
depression and “post-abortion syndrome,” a form of post-traumatic stress 
disorder.198 This claim has taken hold even though it is based largely on 
anecdotal evidence and has little support in legitimate social-science research.199 
According to pro-life advocates, women must be protected from this harm by 
prohibiting abortion altogether.200 
These paternalistic arguments closely track claims made against surrogacy in 
the Baby M period. Surrogacy arrangements also were assumed to be coerced, 
on the view that few women would undertake them in the absence of dire 
financial circumstances.201 Surrogacy opponents also argued that the risk of 
regret was substantial in the surrogacy context because most mothers would not 
voluntarily relinquish their children. Although one cannot trace the genealogy 
of the anti-abortion argument to the surrogacy debate, they likely have a 
common source: Mary Beth Whitehead’s attorney, Harold Cassidy, has been 
among the most prominent proponents of the women-protective argument 
against abortion in recent years.202 
Although surrogacy raised legitimate concerns for feminists203 (not so 
different in some ways from prostitution),204 the unified stance in response to 
Baby M was driven, at least in part, by sympathy for Ms. Whitehead and anger 
at apparent class and gender bias against her as the case played out. The 
withdrawal of women’s advocates implicitly recognizes that endorsing 
paternalistic government restrictions on women’s reproductive choices in this 
 
 196. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“[S]ome women come to regret the choice they 
make to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”) The women-protective argument also 
persuaded the South Dakota legislature to ban abortion, an enactment later defeated by voter 
referendum. See Siegel, supra note 195, at 1642. 
 197. S.D. Task Force to Study Abortion, Report of the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion 
56 (2005), available at http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/Task_Force_Report.pdf (cited in Siegel, 
supra note 195, at 1163). 
 198. Siegel, supra note 195, at 1649. 
 199. Id. at 1653 n.44. 
 200. Id. at 1652 (noting that the South Dakota report expressed concerns that women would receive 
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 203. See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text. 
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context is incompatible with the broader feminist political agenda. In contrast 
to abortion, surrogacy was not a core issue for feminists; ultimately it became 
clear that support for restrictions on surrogacy undermined pro-choice 
advocacy. 
E. A New Balance of Power 
After feminist interest in surrogacy waned, opposition was limited to 
religious and social conservatives, and even for this group, surrogacy likely was 
a minor issue compared to abortion, gay marriage, or divorce reform. This may 
explain the relative lack of controversy in the recent law-reform initiatives. At 
the same time, the popularity of gestational surrogacy and IVF as responses to 
infertility has increased.205 This has led to the growth of interest groups aiming 
to facilitate legal certainty about the parental status of adults who acquire 
children through assisted reproduction; thus, parent’s groups and intermediaries 
have played an active role in lobbying for the new laws.206 
The responsiveness of legislatures to this new coalition of interest groups is 
not surprising. As compared to abortion, surrogacy has never been a highly 
polarizing political issue with powerful factions competing to shape the law. In 
the Baby M period, there was little support for allowing the novel arrangements 
and, with the dissipation of moral panic and the rise of gestational surrogacy, 
few well-funded or emotionally invested opponents have emerged. This may 
explain the pragmatic approach of contemporary lawmakers, who seem to 
accept that surrogacy and other new reproductive technologies are here to stay, 
and to believe that the utility of these arrangements can be enhanced through 
regulation clearly establishing parental status in intended parents.207 
This is not to say that concern about commodification in this context is 
altogether assuaged or that any normative consensus exists about surrogacy. 
The growing number of individuals who satisfy powerful urges to form families 
and have children through commercial transactions continues to be a source of 
concern for ethicists, particularly given the recent trend to “outsource” the 
contracts to India and other countries where surrogates may indeed be poor 
women who have few other income options.208 Moreover, some scholars are 
concerned that the expense of gestational surrogacy effectively limits this 
family-formation option to high-income couples and individuals.209 However, the 
 
 205. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 206. Among the groups that have played an advocacy role in promoting law reform in recent years 
is Resolve, a group of parents and infertility professionals. See RESOLVE: The National Infertility 
Association, http://www.resolve.org (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). 
 207. See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text (discussing passage of Illinois Gestational 
Surrogacy Act). 
 208. See Haworth, supra note 173 (describing a clinic in India arranging for local women to act as 
surrogates for Americans at a fraction of the U.S. cost). 
 209. See Ben-Asher, supra note 181, at 142 (arguing that traditional surrogacy should be allowed 
because only wealthy people can afford gestational surrogacy). Readers responding to Alex 
Kuczynski’s New York Times article about her experience acquiring a child through surrogacy, supra 
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goal of assisted reproduction is relatively benign, and the emerging view among 
lawmakers seems to be that regulation is a better means of minimizing the costs 
than a legal vacuum. 
V 
LESSONS FOR LAWMAKERS 
This account of the political and legal history of surrogacy over more than 
two decades shows lawmakers responding to the issue in two very different 
settings. In the Baby M period, courts and legislatures, reacting to the moral 
panic that surrounded that case, framed surrogacy as degrading 
commodification. Recent judicial and legislative responses have been much 
more practical, with lawmakers seeking to minimize the social costs 
(particularly costs to children) associated with these transactions. Although 
some advocates continue to support the earlier, restrictive approach, lawmakers 
increasingly favor regulation over prohibition as a more effective means of 
promoting social welfare in this context. This may reflect an emerging dominant 
view that legal prohibition of a practice that carries little tangible harm if 
properly regulated is hard to justify. 
In any event, few would argue that lawmaking in the midst of a moral panic 
is optimal. The exaggerated perceptions of risk generated by availability 
cascades almost invariably distort official responses, and government action 
itself can institutionalize the moral panic. This dynamic is certainly not unique 
to surrogacy or to innovations in reproductive technology. It can be seen in the 
response to child sexual abuse, juvenile crime, nuclear power, and even mad-
cow disease.210 In many instances, high-profile incidents focus public attention 
on an issue, generating alarm and cries for the government to “do something—
now.” Lawmaking under conditions of intense political pressure will seldom 
promote society’s long-term interests. 
Does the history of surrogacy as a political issue offer any general lessons 
for responding to issues that generate moral panics? At a minimum, the story 
clarifies that with the passage of time, moral panics tend to dissipate and 
political pressure for government action tends to weaken. For the most part, 
legislatures that did not act in the midst of the Baby M furor did not later pass 
restrictive legislation. In some states, the political climate cooled and bills died 
without a vote. The New Jersey experience is instructive: by the time the task 
force issued its report and sponsors introduced the bill banning surrogacy, 
political pressure and legislative interest had disappeared. 
The passage of time allows the political climate to cool, but it can also serve 
another useful purpose. An extensive period dedicated to acquiring accurate 
 
note 9, criticized the cover picture of the author in front of her Hamptons home featuring the baby’s 
nurse standing at attention nearby. Letters to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 16, 2008, at 16. 
 210. See generally Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 111 (describing many situations, such as the panic 
surrounding Love Canal, in which distorted perceptions of risk generate availability cascades that lead 
to excessively restrictive regulation). 
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information and to deliberation provides the opportunity to correct distortions 
created by availability cascades. Legislative hearings, cost-benefit analyses, and 
the establishment of task forces to undertake in-depth studies of issues can all 
function to facilitate better decisionmaking by lawmakers.211 These mechanisms 
might be particularly useful in contexts in which relevant (and available) 
information is likely to be ignored due to the vivid salience of an incident or 
case that has captured public attention. In other settings—and surrogacy may 
be one—when the novelty of an issue generates alarm and uncertainty, and 
when dire predictions cannot be immediately proved or disproved, a period of 
watchful observation may either allay concerns or clarify the need for restrictive 
regulation. In the case of reproductive technology, the accumulation of 
information and experience has alleviated much of the fear that innovations 
offering individuals increased control over family formation pose a serious 
threat to core social values. 
The history of surrogacy also suggests that the political costs of moving 
slowly in response to a moral panic may be less serious than lawmakers 
anticipate. As an availability cascade builds and public fears escalate, politicians 
may conclude that their only option is to satisfy the demand for action by 
responding quickly to the perceived threat. But moral panics are volatile, and 
the period of intense concern is predictably short lived. The public and the 
media move on to other issues, and even interest groups may adjust their 
political agendas and priorities in ways that divert their focus to other matters. 
Thus, the prescribed response to moral panics of careful study and deliberation 
over an extended period of time is often politically feasible as well as conducive 
to better policymaking. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The history of the changing social and political meaning of surrogacy 
provides an interesting case study that may offer useful insights for 
policymakers. The contemporary pragmatic approach to regulating surrogacy, 
in my view, is superior to the crusade-like urgency of early reformers. Of 
course, this does not settle the question whether these arrangements are 
morally problematic; opinion will continue to be divided on whether 
commercial-surrogacy arrangements devalue children and women in intangible 
ways. But what has become clear is that well-designed regulation can greatly 
mitigate most of the potential tangible harms of surrogacy, and this would seem 
to be the appropriate function of law in a liberal society in response to an issue 
on which no societal consensus exists. 
 
 
 211. See proposals in Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 111, at 746–60. 
